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The September 2007 decision of the SCA in C: SARS v Brummeria 
Renaissance (Pty) Ltd and Others has proven to be one of the most contentious 
tax cases ever decided by a court in our jurisdiction. Questions surrounding the 
interpretation of the judgment and the likely scope of its application are some of 
the most widely debated matters in South African tax circles ever since the 
judgment was delivered. 
In this research paper a study is undertaken into the income tax treatment of an 
interest-free loan receipt. The position as it stood prior to the SCA decision is 
first analysed with particular reference to the legal nature of a contract for the 
loan of money and the tax court decision in ITC 1791. The discourse continues 
with a critical discussion of the Brummeria judgment in order to extract the ratio 
decidendi thereof. 
The ambit of application of the extracted binding principles to selected interest-
free loans (encountered most often in practice) is considered, drawing on views 
expressed by numerous South African tax experts as well as the Revenue 
Authority‟s own stance in this regard, as enunciated in their Draft Interpretation 
Note dealing with the right to use loan capital interest-free. 
As a final application a study is undertaken into the possible arguments 
available to tax subjects to refute an assessment for income tax raised on them 
by SARS on the basis of the binding principles enunciated by the SCA in 
Brummeria. It is concluded that initial fears regarding the potential wide-ranging 
impact of the decision, though justified, may have been over-anticipated as 
strong grounds exist to argue that the scope of the judgment‟s application is not 
likely to extend wider than the type of legal construction found in the case itself, 
namely where an interest-free loan is received in consideration or as a quid pro 






Die beslissing van die Hoogste Hof van Appèl (“HHA”) in C: SARS v Brummeria 
Renaissance (Pty) Ltd and Others gedurende September 2007 blyk een van die 
mees omstrede belastingsake te wees wat tot nog toe in ons jurisdiksie beslis 
is. Kwelvrae rondom die interpretasie van die uitspraak sowel as die 
waarskynlike omvang van die toepassing daarvan is van die aangeleenthede 
wat die wydste gedebateer is in Suid-Afrikaanse belastingkringe in die onlangse 
verlede. 
In die studie word die inkomstebelasting hantering van die ontvangs van „n 
rentevrye lening ondersoek. Die regsposisie voor die beslissing van die HHA 
word eers ontleed met spesifieke verwysing na die regsaard van „n kontrak vir 
die leen van geld en die beslissing van die spesiale inkomstebelasting hof in 
ITC 1791. Die verhandeling gaan voort met „n kritiese bespreking van die 
Brummeria uitspraak ten einde die ratio decidendi daarvan te ekstraheer. 
Die bestek van die toepassing van die saak se bindende beginsels op 
uitgesoekte rentevrye lenings (wat die meeste in die praktyk teёgekom word) 
word oorweeg. In dié verband word verwys na die menings van verskeie Suid-
Afrikaanse belasting-deskundiges, sowel as die Ontvanger van Inkomste se eie 
seining in hierdie verband, soos uiteengesit in hul Konsep Interpretasienota met 
betrekking tot die reg om leningskapitaal rentevry te gebruik. 
In die laaste instansie word „n ondersoek geloods na die moontlike argumente 
wat belastingpligtiges sou kon aanvoer om „n inkomstebelasting-aanslag 
gegrond op die bindende beginsels neergelê deur die HHA in Brummeria, te 
weerlê. Dit word bevind dat aanvanklike vrese aangaande die trefwydte van die 
beslissing, alhoewel geregverdig, moontlik oorversigtig was, aangesien daar 
sterk gronde is om te argumenteer dat die omvang van die uitspraak se 
toepassing waarskynlik beperk is tot die soort regskontruksie wat in die saak 
self aangetref word, naamlik waar „n rentevrye lening ontvang word in ruil vir of 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY 
“the Act”  - the Income Tax Act, No. 58 of 1962 (as amended); 
“CIR” - Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
“C: SARS” - Commissioner for South African Revenue Service 
“SARS” - the South African Revenue Service 
“SATC”  - the “South African Tax Cases Reports”, as 
published by Butterworths; 
“SCA”  -  Supreme Court of Appeal; 
All references to relevant page numbers are to the pages in the SATC, 





1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and problem statement 
For years it had been believed - and has tax law been applied in such a 
manner - that the grant of an interest-free loan would in general not have 
any adverse income tax consequences for the recipient of such a loan. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) in the landmark 
case of C: SARS v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd and others (“the 
Brummeria case”) has left the general consensus concerning the status 
quo in some disarray. The court found that the granting of a right to use 
loan capital interest-free confers on the recipient/borrower a taxable 
benefit which is to be included in gross income as being a right capable 
of being valued in money accruing to the taxpayers.  
It is unclear what the likely scope of the decision‟s impact will be. 
Commentators‟ views vary between the narrowest fact specific 
application to the most wide-ranging general application to all interest-
free loans. 
There are of course instances, as in the case of an interest-free (or low 
interest) loan in an employer-employee relationship and as in the case of 
the deemed income provisions of section 7 of the Income Tax Act (“the 
Act”), where the legislator has laid down very specific rules pertaining to 
the treatment of interest-free loans in certain factual circumstances. This 
paper is however not focussed on the impact of the Brummeria case on 
the type of transactions that the law already addresses pertinently. 
Rather, the focus hereof is on how the interest-free loans most commonly 
encountered in practice are treated in the hands of the borrower, for 
income tax purposes.  
The specific problem statements to be examined and answered can be 
summed up as follows: 
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 Taking cognisance of the legal framework within which loans, 
including interest-free loans operate, what is the likely scope of the 
Brummeria case‟s impact on the income tax position of recipients 
of selected types of interest-free loans? 
 In case of a SARS attack on a borrower on strength of the 
Brummeria case, what are the possible arguments to be advanced 
on behalf of the taxpayer involved to successfully thwart the 
Revenue‟s attack? 
1.2 Aims 
The objectives of the instant research paper therefore are the following: 
 To come to a reasoned conclusion regarding the correct income 
tax treatment of selected interest-free loans in the hands of the 
borrower. 
 To conduct a critical exposé of the SCA judgment in Brummeria in 
order to extract the ratio decidendi (or reasons for the court‟s 
judgment), leaving aside the so-called obiter dicta (remarks or 
conclusions drawn in passing, merely incidental to the court‟s 
ultimate finding). 
 In applying the general principles of South African law (the 
common law, statute law, judicial precedent as well as secondary 
sources of interpretation) and the ratio decidendi of the Brummeria 
case specifically, to selected types of interest-free loan 
transactions, to determine the impact of the Brummeria judgment 
on interest-free loans in general in the hands of a borrower. 
 To suggest possible routes of escape for a borrower taxpayer hit 
by a SARS attack on strength of the Brummeria case. 
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1.3 Survey of relevant literature 
The crisp issue to be addressed in this paper is of course, as was the 
case in the Brummeria judgment, whether due to the receipt of an 
interest-free loan (a loan carrying no interest or a loan without any 
obligation to pay interest) a borrower becomes entitled to or there 
accrues to him an amount otherwise than in cash, as envisaged by the 
definition of gross income in section 1 of the Act. 
Pre-existing case law made it clear that the receipt of loan capital does in 
itself not give rise to a taxing event for purposes of the „gross income‟, as 
the receipt is subject to the repayment of an equal amount of 
money/capital at some time in the future.1 The Commissioner for the 
South African Revenue Service (“C:SARS”), although initially trying to 
assess the taxpayers on this basis, in the end argued and successfully 
assessed the taxpayers on the ground that the right to retain and use the 
loan capital interest-free constituted an amount with an ascertainable 
money value, which accrued to the taxpayers. 
Since the handing down of the judgment, several commentators and tax 
experts have publicly aired views on the probable scope or range of 
impact of the Brummeria case. These include, amongst others, Professor 
Emile Brincker, Professor Henry Vorster, Marius van Blerck, Chris 
Cilliers, David Clegg and David Meyerowitz, S.C. 
Reactions from the legal fraternity have been wide-ranging and a general 
dissensus seems to prevail among writers, most notably those mentioned 
 
                                               
 
1
 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd, 20 SATC 113 at 122;  Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue v Felix Schuh (SA) (Pty) Ltd, 56 SATC 57 at 69. 
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above. In writer‟s view there has developed two clear „schools of thought‟ 
regarding the scope of the Brummeria judgment‟s application. 
On the one hand there are those commentators and experts who are of 
the view that the factual basis of the case is of paramount importance, to 
such an extent that it is rendered distinguishable from the majority of 
hypothetical and/or practical manifestations of interest-free loan 
transactions. Writers who seem to favour this interpretation include 
Brincker, Vorster and Van Blerck. 
On the other hand there is also the view that the judgment in the 
Brummeria case is a principled one capable of general application across 
the range of possible applications of interest-free loans. This school is 
propounded by inter alia Cilliers and Clegg, who beckon that there is, on 
a close reading of the judgment, no clear reason why it should not be 
possible for SARS to apply the decision across the board. 
SARS has waited for just over a year (October 2008) before making 
some form of stance on the issue by releasing a Draft Interpretation Note 
on the application of the Brummeria case, wherein the right to use loan 
capital interest-free is under the magnifying glass. First indications are 
that SARS favour the interpretation of the first-mentioned school of 
thought alluded to above. This is of course excellent news to taxpayers 
and tax advisers alike. However, in the recent Income Tax Case No. 
1830 (70 SATC 123) one of the South African tax community‟s worst 
fears was realised in that SARS argued against its own Interpretation 
Note No. 33 (the contents of which is irrelevant for present purposes) and 
successfully assessed the appellant to tax as a result. The court in that 
matter made it plainly clear (at the top of page 132) that –  
“... the Commissioner cannot (and clearly did not intend to) 
change the law by making concessions to address 
unintended results.” (emphasis added) 
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This serves to highlight to what extent an Interpretation Note of the 
Revenue authority is likely to be of assistance in finding a solution to a 
matter of uncertainty in the interpretation and application of a particular 
statutory provision. 
1.4 Importance of the research 
In the light of the above-mentioned, it is submitted that the research to be 
carried out and concluded upon herein is of the utmost importance in 
coming to a definitive answer to the burning issues (see 1.2 above) 
coming to the fore as a result of the Brummeria judgment. 
1.5 Research design 
The type of research carried out in order to achieve the aims set is a 
mixture of both basic research and applied research. In the first instance 
writer will endeavour to identify the ratio decidendi borne out by the 
SCA‟s decision in the Brummeria case, followed by an exploration into 
the correct application (in writer‟s opinion) of the binding principles of the 
judgment and how this would likely impact on selected practical 
manifestations of interest-free loan transactions. 
The research method followed is the so-called historical method, 
involving a study of the following sources, namely: 
 Relevant South African legislation; 
 Relevant South African case law; 
 Opinions enunciated in articles written by, as well as addresses 
delivered by, South African tax experts and commentators; and 
 Legal analyses by experts in the field of law and tax contained in 
textbooks and similar publications. 
1.6 Framework for the proposed study 
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1.6.1 Chapter 2: The legal framework within which interest-free loans 
operate for purposes of the gross income definition 
This research paper commences with an analysis of the provisions of the 
Income Tax Act relevant to the main issues to be addressed by the paper 
as a whole. All proposed conclusions will be sourced in the general 
charging provision of the Act, namely the gross income definition in 
section 1, as this section formed the basis of the dispute between the 
Commissioner and the companies assessed to tax in the Brummeria 
case. 
The chapter further looks at the legal nature of a loan for consumption, 
the contract type to which a loan of money belongs and what the 
importance hereof is in the view of the taxability of loans. The income tax 
treatment of interest-free loans in the hands of a borrower, before the 
advent of the SCA‟s decision in the Brummeria case, will thereafter be 
discussed in detail. In the final instance cognisance will be taken of the 
tax court‟s decision that preceded the Commissioner‟s appeal to the 
SCA. 
1.6.2 Chapter 3: A critical discussion of the Brummeria case - 
extracting the ratio decidendi in order to determine the likely 
scope of application 
In this chapter the decision of the SCA in the Brummeria case will be put 
under the proverbial spotlight. The court‟s judgment will be summarised, 
whereafter it will be considered what parts of it comprise the so-called 
ratio decidendi (the courts findings on the issues to be decided upon and 
the reasons for such findings) and which constitute mere obiter dicta 
(comments made or opinions expressed by the court which do not bear 
on the issues for decision or the findings qua those issues). 
A critical discussion of the case will also be undertaken in order to 
highlight certain marked difficulties borne out by the judgment. SARS‟s 
view regarding the binding principles to be extracted from the case will 
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also be examined before coming to a reasoned conclusion regarding 
which statements of the court has the power of stare decisis (binding on 
cases heard in lower courts). 
1.6.3 Chapter 4: The impact of the binding principles of the Brummeria 
case and the application thereof to selected interest-free loans 
(and consequent treatment – post-Brummeria) 
In this chapter the specific types of interest-free loans observed most 
often in practice will be identified. The opinions of the most publicised tax 
experts and commentators on the Brummeria case will then be examined 
in order to set out the general consensus (if any) of the taxing fraternity in 
South Africa regarding the likely scope of application of the SCA‟s 
judgment. 
The interpretations of these experts will be grouped into popular views or 
„schools of thought‟. SARS‟s view in this regard, i.e. of the width of 
Brummeria‟s application, will also be taken onboard and a final 
conclusion reached regarding the likely reach of the ratio in the case as it 
applies to interest-free loans in general. 
1.6.4 Chapter 5: Arguments against a possible SARS-attack on the 
basis of Brummeria 
The final scope of enquiry will be to assess what arguments would be 
available to the borrower of an interest-free loan, assessed to income tax 
on the basis of the Brummeria judgment, in order to successfully defend 
such an assessment in a tax court or higher-ranking tribunal. The enquiry 
will focus on two possible assessments, one based on a limited scope 
interpretation of the decision in Brummeria, the other an assessment 
based on the widest-ranging interpretation of the judgment, i.e. to all 
interest-free loans in general. 
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The arguments against both a narrow-scoped and a wide-scoped attack 
will be explored in separate discussions, sourcing back each argument to 
the basis of taxation, namely the gross income definition. 
1.6.5 Chapter 6: Conclusion 
In conclusion a synopsis will be made of the research undertaken 
throughout the course of the discussion as a whole. The aims set for the 
research paper will be revisited and the conclusions reached in the 
aforegoing chapters of the discussion applied to the various research 
objectives. The impact of the Brummeria Renaissance case in the 
treatment of interest-free loans in the hands of the borrower, for purposes 
of the gross income definition will be finally concluded upon. 
1.6.6 Chapter 7: Bibliography 
---000--- 
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2 CHAPTER 2:  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH 
INTEREST-FREE LOANS OPERATE FOR PURPOSES OF THE 
GROSS INCOME DEFINITION - The income tax treatment of 
interest-free loans in the hands of the borrower pre-
Brummeria 
2.1 Gross income definition – Section 1 
Income tax is charged in terms of the Income Tax Act and as such it is 
charged on the taxable income of residents and non-residents of South 
Africa. Pre-determined rates of tax – differing according to the type of tax 
subject it applies to, i.e. a natural person or trust or company (including 
close corporations) – are applied to every tax subject‟s taxable income to 
arrive at an annual liability for income tax. 
The framework within which a person‟s annual taxable income is 
calculated can be represented as follows: 
Gross income (s 1) 
Less  Exemptions (s 10) 
Equals Income (s 1) 
Less  Allowable deductions (ss 11-19, 23 et al) 
Add  Taxable capital gains (s 26A, Eighth Schedule) 
Less  Assessed loss brought forward if applicable (s 20) 
Equals Taxable income (s 1) 
Plain to see from the above is the major importance of what constitutes 
the „gross income‟ of a person. It is the pool of taxable rewards from 
which all allowable exemptions and deductions are subtracted in order to 
come to the amount on which income tax can and must be levied. 
The definition of „gross income‟ in section 1 of the Act reads as follows: 
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“gross income”, in relation to any year or period of assessment, 
means– 
(i) in the case of a resident, the total amount, in cash or 
otherwise, received by or accrued to or in favour of such 
resident; or 
(ii) in the case of any person other than a resident, the total 
amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to or in 
favour of such person from a source within or deemed to be 
within the Republic, 
during such year or period of assessment, excluding receipts or 
accruals of a capital nature... 
The definition then continues to give an extended list of items (receipts 
and accruals) which are specifically included in the definition of gross 
income, notwithstanding the fact that it may otherwise not have 
constituted gross income on account of the fact that it does not meet 
each of the defining criteria (components) of „gross income‟. 
For purposes of the instant discussion, writer will be taking cognisance of 
neither the treatment of receipts and accruals of non-residents, nor any of 
the specific inclusions listed in the gross income definition. The particular 
scope of the matter dealt with herein will be limited to the interpretation 
and application of the following parts of the definition, namely: 
- the total amount in cash or otherwise 
- received by or accrued to or in favour of a person 
- excluding receipts and accruals of a capital nature. 
In order for an item of income (here used in layman‟s terms) to constitute 
„gross income‟ in the determination of a tax subject‟s liability for income 
tax in South Africa, the above-mentioned criteria will all have to be 
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satisfied. Even if only one is not met, the tax subject goes free, i.e. is not 
caught in the tax net. 
Amounts in cash or otherwise 
For a particular receipt or accrual to constitute „gross income‟ in the 
hands of a tax subject it must be an amount. Seeing as the meaning of 
this term is not defined by the act, one has to turn to case law – i.e. 
identify the interpretation given it by our national courts – to ascertain its 
meaning and the ambit of its application. 
One of the first cases decided on this topic was the 1926 decision of the 
Cape Provincial Division of the High Court in Lategan v CIR2. Judge 
Watermeyer, delivering a unanimous decision states at 19 that: 
“ “Income” … was what a man earned by his work or his wits 
or by the employment of his capital. The rewards which he 
got might come to him in the form of cash or of some other 
kind of corporeal property or in the form of rights.” 
He continues to say that the word “amount” had to be given a wider 
meaning so as to encompass both receipts and accruals sounding in 
money (cash) as well as the value of every form of property (whether 
corporeal or incorporeal, including debts and rights of action) earned by 
the taxpayer, i.e. otherwise than in cash – which had a money value. 
(own emphasis) 
 
                                               
 
2
 W H Lategan v CIR, 2 SATC 16. 
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The Appellate Division first touched on this in a split judgment in 19333, 
Chief Justice Wessels, finding with the majority in that instance, 
enunciating his views as follows: 
“The tax is to be assessed in money on all receipts or 
accruals having a money value. If it is something which is not 
money‟s worth or cannot be turned into money, it is not to be 
regarded as income (Tennant v Smith, 1892 AC 150; St. 
Lucia Usines Co v Treasurer of St. Lucia, 1924, 93 LJPC 
212).” 
Several years later the court had an opportunity to revisit and pronounce 
on the interpretation of this part of the gross income definition once more, 
in the case of CIR v People‟s Stores (Walvis Bay)(Pty)Ltd4. Appeal Judge 
Hefer confirms the correctness of the judgment of Watermeyer J in 
Lategan‟s case and after finding authority (in three other cases of the 
court) for applying an extended meaning to the term amount, pronounces 
that “…income in a form other than money must, in order to qualify for 
inclusion in the „gross income‟, be of such a nature that a value can be 
attached to it in money.” The court then follows this up with the quoted 
extract from the Delfos case and concludes on this issue that as the 
debts which accrued to the taxpayer could be turned into money5, it 
merited the inclusion thereof in gross income. 
The next matter to be decided in this milieu was that of Stander v CIR6. 
The court at 623, with reference to ITC 7017, remarks that Conradie J in 
 
                                               
 
3
 CIR v Delfos, 6 SATC 92. 
4
 1990 (2) SA 353 (A). 
5
 People‟s Stores at 367. 
6
 1997 (3) SA 617 (C). 
7
 (1950) 17 SATC 108. 
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last-mentioned matter rejected the argument that only benefits which a 
taxpayer can turn into money has a money‟s  worth, on the grounds that 
a service which is available in the market place has a value attached to it 
by the market. Such market value would be the value of the benefit 
enjoyed by anyone availing himself thereof. The court (in Stander) 
furthermore rejected the submission of counsel for the Commissioner that 
in order to determine money‟s worth an objective value had to be placed 
on the award received by the taxpayer. The court finally concluded on 
this issue by finding that: 
“Whatever it cost Delta, or whatever a person who wished to 
go on such a trip would have had to pay for it, does not 
constitute an amount which can be said to have money‟s 
worth in Stander‟s hands.” 
The court therefore applied a subjective approach in determining whether 
the receipt in question had money‟s worth for the specific taxpayer. As it 
could not be encashed by him it was found not to constitute an amount. 
In somewhat stark contrast hereto stands the majority decision of the 
Appellate Division in Ochberg v CIR8. In this case the taxpayer, being the 
sole shareholder of a company (except for 6 of the 5107 ordinary issued 
shares), was issued with a number of bonus/capitalisation shares as 
consideration for services rendered and for the use of premises. The 
taxpayer admitted that if the shares had been received by another 
person, it would have constituted income and could not have been a 
receipt or accrual of a capital nature. 
 
                                               
 
8
 (1931) 5 SATC 93 
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The argument made by the taxpayer, however, was that he derived no 
benefit from this receipt and that there was therefore no (gross) income. 
The majority of the court‟s response hereto is found on 97, delivered by 
chief justice De Villiers: 
“… in determining whether the amount is income or capital 
this circumstance [i.e. the presence or absence of any real 
benefit to the taxpayer] does not affect either the nature of 
the transaction or the nature of the value received. … any 
receipt constitutes income with the single exception of a 
receipt or accrual of a capital nature. … Whether and to what 
extent the person may have benefited by the receipt of the 
income is irrelevant…” 
And at 98: 
“The fact is the law is not concerned with the amount of the 
benefit accruing to a person from a certain income. It is 
sufficient to determine that what the appellant has received is 
income and not capital.” 
The two dissenting Appeal Judges, Wessels and Stratford, came to their 
decisions on broadly the same terms, namely that the appellant‟s estate 
had not been enriched by the transaction in casu and as a result it cannot 
be said that any amount has been received by or accrued to him. Both 
judges mention that the substance of the transaction has to be taken into 
account and not merely its superficial appearance. Appeal Judge 
Stratford indicated in no uncertain terms that the value or nature of the 
consideration given by the appellant for the issue of shares to him is 
wholly immaterial in the determination of whether an amount has been 
received or accrued to him. The learned judge felt himself bound to look 
at the real nature of the issue and its value to the appellant and surmised 
that he could not agree with the reasoning of the majority that the value of 
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the issue has to be looked at in the abstract regardless of its value to the 
recipient (own emphasis). 
Without entering into an at all lengthy or in depth discussion of substance 
over form, if this judgment is anything to go by, it seems clear that when 
considering whether an amount has been received by or has accrued to a 
tax subject, it is the legal substance of the transaction entered into and 
not the commercial substance thereof that is of importance. If the tax 
subject intends for a specific transaction to have effect according to its 
purport, it is not up to the court to enter into a complete exposition of the 
tax subject‟s individual financial position apart from the transaction itself 
in order to ascertain whether he has in fact been enriched by the 
transaction and if indeed, to what extent his estate has been increased. 
It is submitted that the majority of the court in reality took a two tier 
approach in determining the amount received by the taxpayer in 
Ochberg‟s case and such approach can be enunciated in the following 
terms. Once it stands firm that there was a receipt or accrual, the first 
question to be answered is whether the receipt or accrual in casu is 
otherwise than in cash? Put differently, if what has been received by or 
has accrued to the taxpayer is not money, what is it that he has received? 
If a contractual right, then it is the legal substance or nature of that right 
that is of the essence. 
The second tier of enquiry, once the first has been answered in the 
affirmative, would then be to place a money value on the non-cash 
receipt or accrual, if indeed the right received is of such a nature that a 
value can be attached to it in money. If the right or other non-cash receipt 
is incapable of valuation, the enquiry is halted at this second hurdle and 
no amount is received or accrues for purposes of „gross income‟. This 
being said, one is to bear in mind the finding of Hefer JA on 364 of 
People‟s Stores that although the valuation may be considerably 
complex, it does not detract from the principle that all income having a 
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money value must be included. His further reasoning9 then takes 
cognisance of the above postulated two tier approach alluded to by 
writer, namely that once it stands firm that a right has been acquired by 
the taxpayer, the value thereof has to be determined to arrive at the 
amount to be included in gross income.  
In the determination of whether a receipt would qualify as an amount for 
„gross income‟ and the value of such receipt, as well as in the later 
enquiry into the capital or revenue nature thereof, the consideration (the 
nature thereof) given by the tax subject in return for the receipt is of major 
importance. The receipt itself is consideration for the tax subject‟s 
rendering of service or the productive employment of his capital or his 
reward for a business or profit-making scheme carried on by him. 
Received by or accrued to or in favour of a person 
The second part of the gross income definition which is of particular 
relevance for the instant enquiry is the concepts of receipts and accruals. 
The wording of the definition is such that an amount is only to be taxed at 
the earliest of when it has been received by or accrued to the tax subject 
– if due weight is attached to the word or between the two taxing events. 
[The decisions of the Appellate Division in the cases of Delfos10 and SIR 
v Silverglen Investments (Pty) Ltd11 is authority for this interpretation.] 
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Receipt, in our law does not envisage a unilateral receipt12. It has to flow 
from a bilateral agreement (contract) or other obligationes causans 
(“verbintenisskeppende oorsaak”). 
Certain bilateral or contractual receipts do however not constitute receipts 
for the purposes of „gross income‟. One such example, of some 
relevance to the present discussion, is the receipt of a loan. In the Appeal 
Court decision in CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd13 a unanimous court finds 
that all loans (receipts thereof, that is) are essentially and necessarily of a 
capital nature (122 of the judgment). The court then elaborates on this 
finding by stating: 
“I have grave doubts whether this argument does not fail at 
the outset on the ground that borrowed money is not 
received nor does it accrue within the meaning … of the 
definition of „gross income‟ … It is difficult to see how money 
obtained on loan can, even for the purposes of the wide 
definition of „gross income‟, be part of the income of the 
borrower … [123] At the same moment that the borrower is 
given possession he falls under an obligation to repay. What 
is borrowed does not become his, except in the sense, 
irrelevant for present purposes, that if what is borrowed is 
consumable there is in law a change of ownership in the 
actual things borrowed. … a borrowing, by its very nature, 
involves a correspondence between what is obtained and the 
obligation to repay or redeliver.” 
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Whether the court intended for the above quoted passage to form part of 
its reasons for judgment (ratio decidendi) and whether the learned judge 
of appeal was merely expressing an opinion in passing (obiter dictum), 
writer is hesitant to conclude on. What has however been confirmed by 
the passage of time and through subsequent reliance on Genn‟s case is 
that this passage has been accepted as correctly reflecting the treatment 
of a loan receipt for the purposes of the gross income definition. When 
the court in CIR v Felix Schuh (SA)(Pty) Ltd14 was again faced with the 
same question as in Genn, it found no difficulty in pronouncing that the 
loan and corresponding obligation to repay it have by themselves no 
fiscal consequences as the loan is a so-called „neutral factor‟. 
This treatment of a receipt of loan capital was accepted as correct in the 
Brummeria case and can it therefore be regarded as one of the few 
places of secure footing with regards to the treatment also of interest-free 
loans in the hands of their recipients – as regards the receipt of the loan 
capital. 
Accrual, on the other hand, (in simple terms) deals with when a right to a 
future receipt, can in itself constitute a gross income event. When an 
amount can be said to have accrued to a tax subject has been the focus 
of many a judicial pronouncement over the past century. These cases, 
most of which have already been referred to above, are that of Lategan, 
Delfos and People‟s Stores15. The first-mentioned case laid down the 
principle that the term „accrued to or in favour of any person‟ meant that 
to which the person has become entitled. In Delfos uncertainty arose 
around what the correct interpretation was, as the court was divided 
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around the correct meaning to be attached to this term. The majority 
however confirmed the correctness of the interpretation given in Lategan. 
There was thus some uncertainty as to whether the intended meaning of 
„accrued to‟ was „has become entitled to‟ or whether it rather had to be 
interpreted to mean „due and payable‟. 
Conflicting views prevailed until the advent of the third-mentioned 
decision, that of People‟s Stores, wherein at last our Supreme Court 
brought finality by siding unanimously with the principle laid down in 
Lategan. Thus, accrual will take place at the earliest moment in time at 
which a tax subject has an unconditional entitlement to an amount in 
terms of whatever transaction. As soon as all conditions have been met it 
matters not that a specific debt may not be payable (claimable) at once – 
as it may be affected by a time clause allowing the tax subject to only 
take steps in recovery of the amount from a set date some time in the 
future. 
Although the present value of an accrued debt, which only becomes 
payable at some future date, may be significantly lower than the face 
value thereof, the legislator subsequent to the People‟s Stores decision 
inserted a proviso to the gross income definition, compelling tax subjects 
from that point forward to include those amounts to which they have 
become entitled to during a year of assessment at its face value. 
Excluding receipts and accruals of a capital nature 
As this part of the gross income definition was not dealt with in the 
Brummeria judgment, although a last gasp effort was made by the 
taxpayers to raise this point, the discussion of this part will merely be 
dealt with by writer in a cursory manner. 
In general, receipts and accruals that are of a capital nature are not 
included in the calculation of a person‟s gross income, except in so far as 
the Act compels the specific inclusion of such items in paragraphs (a) to 
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(n) of the gross income definition. All receipts and accruals of a tax 
subject fall into either of these two categories – it is either of a revenue 
nature or of a capital nature. In cases of uncertainty one of the well-
known ways to determine what is income and what is capital is to ask 
what constitutes the tree and what is the fruit of the tree? In this analogy, 
of course, whatever can be classified or identified as the tree, i.e. the 
income-producing structure or business operations - that is capital. That 
which is identifiable as fruit of the income-producing structure or assets – 
such is income or of a revenue nature. 
When it comes to determining the capital nature or otherwise of assets, 
the enquiry becomes slightly more involved. The best way to illustrate this 
is to take the example of a sale of residential property. Surely the 
proceeds from such a sale would make for a capital receipt? But what of 
the case where a person is involved in a business undertaking of which 
the main objective is the buying of and selling residential property at a 
profit, i.e. a property trader. Matters take on a different complexion in 
such cases as the person arguably would not hold the property merely as 
capital assets to realise at the highest possible gain. Rather, the property 
itself is its trading stock, bought and sold on a regular turn-over. In such 
person‟s hands the property would likely be of a revenue nature and the 
proceeds from its sale would constitute income. 
It is therefore clear that the main determining factor in the enquiry into the 
nature of a particular receipt or accrual is the intention of the tax subject 
dealing with the asset. Factors that will be taken into account by a court 
in determining whether a receipt is of a capital or revenue nature is inter 
alia the taxpayer‟s testimony of his intention, seen in the context of the 
surrounding facts and circumstances, the length of time the tax subject 
has held the asset, the frequency of the tax subject‟s dealings in a 
particular kind of asset, the nature of the asset concerned, the nature of 
the tax subject‟s business and the reason for selling the asset. 
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2.2 Loan for consumption – the nature of the legal creature 
Two types of loan are known to the South African legal system, namely 
loan for use (commodatum) and loan for consumption (mutuum). As is 
clear from the bracketed terms, both these manifestations of the loan 
concept have their roots in Roman law and would have been incepted 
into South African law via the 17th century Roman-Dutch common law. 
The major distinction between the two types of loan contract is that in the 
case of a loan for use the borrower is obliged to return the exact same 
thing lent to the lender at the end of the loan term, whereas under a loan 
for consumption the object of the contract is some fungible thing, which 
the borrower is at liberty to consume. He is merely bound to return the 
same type of thing borrowed and of equal value. 
Because of the particular nature a loan for consumption, the thing lent 
must be something with equivalents that consists of units which can be 
counted, weighed or measured. The most common example of such a 
loan is a loan of money. The legal content of a loan for consumption is 
that the lender both puts the borrower in possession of the thing, but also 
transfers ownership in the thing to the borrower, thereby legally entitling 
him to consume it.16 
In the matter of Cactus Investments v CIR17 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, dealing with loans for consumption, said that as it “… brought 
about that each borrower became the owner of the money received, the 
interest cannot be compensation to Cactus for the use of Cactus‟s 
money.” 
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Having already touched on the concept of interest, it is of the utmost 
importance for present purposes to acknowledge the fact that at common 
law a loan of money was gratuitous, subject to an exception, namely that 
the lender could stipulate, i.e. specifically contract (accidentalia) for the 
payment of interest. As such the interest obligation constitutes a reward 
for transferring ownership in his money to the borrower, at all times 
subject to the borrower‟s obligation (one of the essentialia) under the 
contract to return legal tender of the amount lent to him. The important 
point to be gathered from this exposition is that unless agreed to (i.e. 
contracted for), the lender has no right to claim interest from the borrower 
and the borrower is under no obligation to remunerate the lender in this 
manner. South African statutory law furthermore recognises this 
established common law principle. The exception to the preceding 
principle is so-called interest a tempore morae or mora interest, which 
starts to run from the time that a debt, being already due and payable has 
been demanded from the debtor and notwithstanding such demand, the 
debtor fails to discharge his indebtedness. This type of interest obligation 
can only be invoked in the particular circumstances mentioned and forms 
a statutory departure from the common law principles of interest 
entitlement. It is a penal measure and thus irrelevant for purposes of the 
present discussion. 
To put into context then the interest-free loan – an interest-free loan is a 
consensual contract for the loan of money (a loan for consumption) to 
which no stipulation for interest has been added, either through the 
parties agreeing that interest will not be charged or by the lender not 
insisting thereon or by it merely not being dealt with in the contract of 
loan. Seen from the point of view of the borrower, he receives the 
lender‟s money without the added obligation of having to remunerate the 
latter for being bereft of a specific amount of money for the period of the 
loan contract. Seen from the lender‟s point of view, he has parted with his 
money, having transferred ownership therein to the borrower, and has no 
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other rights, like a right to receive interest, other than the right to have an 
amount equal to the loan capital transferred to the borrower, repaid to 
him at the end of the period of the loan contract. 
2.3 The treatment of interest-free loans in the hands of the 
borrower for purposes of the ‘gross income’ definition – pre-
Brummeria 
Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Brummeria‟s 
case, it had been steadfastly believed that the receipt of an interest-free 
loan did, in general (i.e. not taking into account for example the specific 
provisions of section 7 of the Act and paragraph 2(f) and 11 of the 
Seventh Schedule of the Act), not have any adverse income tax 
consequences for the borrower. Subsequent thereto there are very few 
tax subjects and even their trusted advisers who have certainty about 
what to believe and how strongly to believe therein. This burning issue 
will be discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 of this paper. The rest of 
the current chapter however will be dedicated to a discussion of the 
status quo. 
The question to be answered therefore is whether the conclusion of a 
loan contract or the receipt of money on loan account constitutes or could 
give rise to an amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to or 
in favour of the borrower/recipient? And if answered in the affirmative, 
whether it would not constitute a receipt or accrual of a capital nature? 
Firstly in this regard, the principle laid down in two previously cited cases, 
namely Genn and Felix Schuh, is of primary importance. As indicated 
above18 it is generally accepted by the courts and therefore also by the 
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tax public and the fiscus that the receipt of loan capital does not 
constitute a receipt or accrual for purposes of „gross income‟. This is so 
for a couple of reasons, namely that loans are of its nature essentially or 
necessarily a capital receipt and – probably the much more important 
reason – as the receipt is at all times coupled with the obligation to repay 
the amount so received. If it was to be included in gross income and 
assuming the repayment obligation was to be an allowable deduction, 
these two events would happen simultaneously, as the obligation to 
repay would be unconditional as of the moment of receipt. 
In Lategan‟s case it was found that in order for a receipt or accrual 
otherwise than in cash to qualify for inclusion in gross income – being an 
amount – it must constitute the value of (every form of) property, whether 
corporeal or incorporeal, including debts and rights of action – which had 
a money value. 
It is submitted that what should be evident from the above reference to 
the so-called Lategan principle is that in order for a receipt or accrual 
otherwise than in cash to constitute an a amount, capable of inclusion in 
gross income, it must firstly be property and secondly it must have a 
money value or it must be possible to attach a value to it in money. 
Jansen van Rensburg19, addressing the concept of „amount‟ in her article 
on this issue, is of a similar persuasion and deals in some detail with the 
meaning of property20. A person‟s “property” is determined by taking 
account of the subjective rights that he holds. The rights of a person that 
are of particular relevance in the context of „gross income‟ are real rights 
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(ius in rem) and personal rights (ius in personam). Real rights include 
ownership of corporeal and incorporeal things, whereas personal rights 
are rights to a performance (such as to delivery or to some ommissio or 
commissio).  
A person obtains personal rights (rights to performance) inter alia from 
contracts. In the case of a loan contract the borrower acquires a personal 
right to claim payment of the loan amount (for the lender to transfer the 
ownership in the money to him). At the conclusion of the contract such 
right would accrue to him, but the right would be encumbered with the 
obligation that on receipt of the loan capital he becomes indebted to the 
lender to repay to him an equal amount of money at the end of the loan 
period. This accrual would then be followed by the receipt of the 
amount/ownership of the money coupled with the repayment obligation. If 
this would have constituted an amount for purposes of gross income, 
such amount would only have been included in the borrower‟s gross 
income once, at the earliest of accrual or receipt. 
As to the capital or revenue nature of a receipt of loan capital (whether 
interest-bearing or interest-free) it has to be said that in the majority of 
cases encountered in the market place, such a receipt – assuming for the 
moment that it could constitute a receipt at all for purposes of both the 
gross income definition and CGT (contrary to the ratio decidendi in Genn) 
– would constitute a capital receipt. If adjudicated from the point of view 
of the lender – who, in layman‟s terms, is in reality putting out his money 
at usury (i.e. he has a debt claim) – this right to repayment would 
constitute a capital amount if it is held as an investment by him. Similarly, 
the borrower receiving the loan moneys to conduct an outlay of his 
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income-producing structure would be receiving it on capital account. As 
noted in the discussion above21 it is important to note the nature of the 
performance (contractual obligation) of the borrower in return for which 
the loan has been given as consideration, if such exists, as this could 
impact on the revenue or capital nature of the receipt. However, many 
interest-free loans in commerce are not granted in exchange for 
something else (as consideration or a so-called quid pro quo) and should 
this complication not necessarily impact that heavily in practice. 
Consider then what implications interest or rather, the absence of an 
obligation to pay interest would have in this context. If the loan was 
indeed interest-bearing, the probable treatment thereof would have been 
that the borrower would have been able to claim a deduction under 
section 11(a) of the Act for interest paid or payable. In other words the 
only effect the loan contract, coupled with the stipulation for interest, 
would have on the tax subject‟s calculation of taxable income is a 
deduction of an allowable expense (say in the amount of Rx). He would 
of course have been able to do with the amount of loan capital as he 
pleased (seeing as he would have become the owner thereof22) and as a 
result something would probably be earned by him – included in gross 
income – whether in the same year of assessment or in some future year, 
although these earnings may not necessarily be identifiable and capable 
of being linked (causally) to annual interest expenses. 
If on the other hand the loan is made to the borrower free of any 
obligation to pay interest at some agreed annualised rate on the 
outstanding amount of the loan, can it be said that an amount (of a non-
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capital nature), otherwise than in cash has accrued to or has been 
received by the tax subject? Writer‟s unqualified (as yet) answer hereto 
would be a resounding „no‟. Merely looking at the effect thereof on „gross 
income‟ should, in writer‟s view, in itself be adequate to dispel any 
uncertainty in this regard. The influence of an interest-bearing loan on 
taxable income is (refer paragraph above) negative Rx. The influence of 
a loan free of the obligation to pay interest does not afford the borrower 
such a deduction against income, i.e. income is not decreased by an 
interest cost equal to Rx, as the borrower has no such contractual 
obligation. Thus the interest-free loan has a zero annual influence on the 
calculation of the borrower‟s taxable income over the period of the loan 
contract. The matter will be developed upon throughout the course of this 
discussion. 
At this juncture it is important to note that not all rights received by or 
accrued to a tax subject have a money value or merits an inclusion into 
gross income. So for instance where a company leases a building from 
the owner thereof the income tax implications is rather straightforward. 
The owner (or lessor) productively employs his capital to work for him, by 
giving a right of use thereof to the lessee at a monthly consideration in 
the form of rent. This rental income is then included in the lessor‟s gross 
income. 
The treatment of the right of use received by the lessee has similarly 
been unchallenged to date. The receipt of the right of use, although 
undoubtedly received by the lessee – for if such right has not been legally 
transferred to the lessee under the contract of lease the lessee would be 
in unlawful occupation thereof and would not be able to defend an 
eviction application against it by the lessor – is either not included in the 
gross income of the lessee or if indeed included, is included at a value of 
zero. The lessee, under the contract also incurs a monthly obligation to 
remunerate the lessor for the right of use. This monthly rental is allowed 
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as a deduction against the lessee‟s income to the extent that the property 
is used in the production of income. 
If the lessor and lessee in the above example were to be companies in 
the same group and South Africa operated a system of accounting for tax 
on a consolidated basis, the net effect of the above postulation (for 
income tax) would have been zero. Similarly, it is open to the parties to – 
instead of entering into a lease agreement – agree to a loan for use 
(commodatum) whereby the owner places the building at the borrower‟s 
disposal and there is neither the right to claim remuneration for the 
lender, nor the obligation on the borrower to pay anything to the lender 
for the right of use. In such a case, surely the net effect for income tax 
would be the same as under the contract of lease, i.e. zero – no rental 
income, no rental expense and the receipt of the right of use by the 
borrower which is either not included in gross income or if so included, 
then at a zero value. Surely it could not be right to say that in the case of 
a loan for use the borrower is obliged to include as gross income an 
amount equal to a market related rental he would have been obligated to 
pay, but did not have to pay because the agreement was one of loan and 
not one of lease? 
For the same token – if a loan is not interest-bearing (i.e. the lender has 
no contractual right to interest income and no interest deduction applies 
for the borrower), does the borrower receive or does there accrue to him 
an amount in cash or otherwise (i.e. property), not of a capital nature? As 
Jansen van Rensburg (2007:46) points out: 
“The “benefit” of not having to pay interest is neither a 
personal right nor any other form of property. It thus cannot 
constitute an amount for purposes of the definition of “gross 
income”, irrespective of whether or not it has value.” 
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Refer also to the discussion above of the decision of the Appellate 
Division in Ochberg23 concerning the relevance of the benefit test for 
purposes of the gross income definition. 
Under South African common law the charging of interest is not one of 
the essentialia of a loan of money, nor one of its naturalia. If thus not 
provided for contractually between the parties, no right (lender) and no 
obligation (borrower) ensue. There is also no such statutory obligation to 
pay interest, which the parties are allowed to contract out of, thereby 
affording the borrower a “right not to pay interest”. This is plainly not the 
position in South African law and for this reason alone, the absence of an 
agreement regarding interest does not somehow translate into an amount 
of money received by or accrued to the borrower under a loan for 
consumption. 
Viewed from a slightly different perspective, but still in keeping with the 
legal nature of a monetary loan, the borrower cannot be said to have a 
continuous right against the lender, entitling him to compel the lender to 
keep the loan capital at his disposal over the whole course of the loan 
period. If this had been so there may have been an argument to be made 
that this enforceable right to performance that the borrower holds against 
the lender has a money value and is therefore susceptible for inclusion in 
gross income – although this would still not resolve the anomaly 
regarding the double taxation that would result in the hands of the 
borrower (when comparing the interest-free loan to one bearing interest). 
Rather, the position under our law is that by giving a loan for consumption 
the lender transfers ownership in the money (thus including all the 
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competencies included in ownership) and in so doing dispenses with his 
only obligation under the contract, which is to give the borrower his 
money. Once parted with and received by the borrower, the lender has 
no more rights thereto. It has now become the borrower‟s money. 
Ownership in the amount of money has been transferred. The lender is 
left with a contractual right to receive an equal amount of currency at the 
end of the loan period. He receives this right at the moment of 
transferring his money to the borrower. It does however only become due 
and payable and thus enforceable (although unconditional from day one) 
at the end of the agreed loan period. 
2.4 ITC 179124 
The controversial decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the 
Brummeria Case was preceded by the judgment of the Gauteng Income 
Tax Special Court in ITC 1791. The judgment of Goldblatt J, on behalf of 
the court (Mr I B Skosana was the Accounting Member and Mr M C van 
Blerck, the Commercial Member) confirmed the view held above 
regarding the treatment in the hands of the borrower, of a receipt of loan 
capital devoid of an interest obligation, for purposes of the gross income 
definition. The facts of the case (i.e. Brummeria) is of major significance, 
to a lesser extent for the Special Court decision, but certainly so for the 
conclusion reached by the SCA. It is also crucially important in the 
context of the discussion to follow and will it therefore be dealt with in 
some detail below. 
The Appellants, Brummeria and two other private companies, were 
developers of retirement villages. During the years of assessment 
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relevant to the appeal the appellants entered into agreements with 
potential occupants of units to be constructed in retirement villages. The 
provisions of the agreements, relevant for present purposes, were that 
the appellants obtained interest-free loans from occupants (to finance the 
construction of retirement units), in return for or as consideration for 
which the appellants granted to the lenders lifelong occupation rights to 
the units, although ownership of the units remained with the appellants at 
all times. In addition hereto the parties agreed that the appellants would 
be obliged to repay a specific loan upon the earlier of cancellation of the 
agreement or the occupant‟s death. 
The Commissioner initially assessed the appellants on their net loan 
receipts for the relevant year of assessment. These assessments were 
withdrawn only to be replaced by revised assessments. The basis of the 
latter was that a benefit had been received by the appellants, namely the 
right of use of interest-free loans, which benefit constituted an amount 
otherwise than in cash that was taxable as „gross income‟. The 
Commissioner determined the (annual) value of the amount identified by 
him by multiplying the average amount of loan capital held by the 
appellant by the average market related interest rate (prime overdraft 
rate) for that year and subjected it to tax in the relevant years. 
The appellants‟ grounds of objection (such as is relevant for this 
discussion) were that they had not received any amount for the purposes 
of „gross income‟. The salient grounds of assessment in the 
Commissioner‟s statement in terms of the tax court‟s rules, were the 
following: 
”In the case of a developer conducting a housing scheme for retired 
persons, the capital of the developer is the property units. The property 
units are employed in its business by either: 
selling the units under sectional title to the purchasers; or 
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granting the use (occupation) of the units to the occupiers by way of 
selling life rights to the occupiers. 
The quid pro quo which the developer received in return is, respectively: 
the selling price obtained from the purchasers, in respect of the disposal 
of the units under sectional title; or 
the benefit of the rights to interest free loans obtained from the 
occupiers, in respect of the disposal of the life rights to occupy the units. 
The benefit received in exchange for the provision of occupation rights 
has an ascertainable money value and accordingly falls within the 
definition of “gross income” of the Act.” 
The court, after citing the gross income definition, referred to the Lategan 
principle25 and the affirmation thereof in the People‟s Stores case. The 
court‟s ruling on the issues to be decided is found in paragraphs 12 
through 15 of the judgment. The gist of their finding can be summed up 
as follows (actual wording of the judgment in quotation marks and 
italicised): 
The court found that the Commissioner‟s assessment was based on 
notional income which does not fall to be included in gross income. 
According to the court the “rights” allegedly obtained by the appellants 
were not rights capable of transfer or cession. The inference to be drawn 
from the fact that the court found it necessary to denote the word “rights” 
in quotation marks is that they were not of the opinion that the notional 
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benefit sought to be taxed by the Commissioner were indeed rights in the 
ordinary meaning of the word, writer submits. 
The court‟s views on the legal nature of a monetary loan26 do not in all 
respects accord with writer‟s exposition thereof in 2.2 above, but the court 
did remark that the “[p]ossession of money cannot in itself earn income 
as it is merely an income producing tool which may be used by the 
possessor to earn income but need not be so used. What the 
Commissioner has attempted to do is to treat the opportunity to earn 
income as income.” In paragraph 15 of the judgment the court accepts on 
the basis of the decision in Genn that the obtaining of loan capital 
constitutes a receipt, although of a capital nature. 
With regards to the absence of an interest obligation the court expressed 
the opinion that if such an aspect of a loan makes it more valuable to the 
borrower, this would merely affect the potential utility (i.e. usefulness to 
earn income in the future) of the capital receipt in his hands, but does not 
in itself increase gross income. The court then develops this point to 
make it clear that a low interest rate or no interest would have the effect 
of making the borrower‟s future taxable income higher than it would have 
been, had the loan been interest-bearing at all or if it had borne interest at 
a higher (market related) rate. 
On these premises the court found in favour of the appellants and set 
aside the assessments by the Commissioner. 
Writer does not find it useful to express an opinion on the correctness or 
otherwise of the tax court‟s decision as, so it is submitted, it is not 
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material to the focus of this paper (it is arguable, though that these 
principles could still find application in later cases). Also, as the income 
tax treatment of the receipt of an interest-free loan has been dealt with 
comprehensively elsewhere27, such opinion would not at this stage add 
anything of value to the discussion. 
2.5 Conclusion 
It is submitted that the correct treatment of a loan of money and of the 
presence or absence of an agreement regarding the payment of interest 
(or an agreement that no interest will be charged, for that matter) in the 
hands of a borrower has to be evaluated within the wide, though strict 
confines of the gross income definition. This is undoubtedly so as the 
ground principle for the interpretation (and thus the application) of fiscal 
legislation enunciated in the case of CIR v George Forest Timber Co.28 
and alluded to in the Delfos case (at 253) must be accepted as sound: 
“… if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter 
of the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship 
may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if 
the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the 
subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, 
however apparently within the law the case might otherwise 
appear to be.” 
In the case of a receipt or accrual otherwise than in cash, such as a debt 
or right, the legal substance or nature of such right is of crucial 
importance in determining the taxability of the receipt. When dealing with 
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an interest-free loan, the absence of an obligation to pay interest, cannot 
be said to translate to the receipt or accrual of an amount otherwise than 
in cash for gross income. The fact that the tax subject will not have an 
allowable deduction (interest expense) to diminish his taxable income for 
a particular year of assessment means that the net amount of his taxable 
income will – taking a pragmatic view – already be higher in the amount 
of the interest deduction unavailable to him. In such circumstance he will 
therefore already be effectively taxed on the absence of an obligation to 
pay interest on the loan. 
With the above in mind and the treatment of the Income Tax Special 
Court of the Brummeria-facts dealt with, writer will in the following chapter 
proceed to do a critical analysis of Brummeria with a view to determine its 




3 CHAPTER 3:  A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE 
BRUMMERIA CASE - extracting the ratio decidendi in order 
to determine the likely scope of application 
3.1 The Brummeria judgment 
The matter of C:SARS v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd29 came before 
the SCA on appeal from the Johannesburg Tax Court‟s decision in ITC 
1791 (as discussed above). The court‟s decision on the issues of critical 
importance to the focus of the present discussion, span the whole of 12 
paragraphs30. 
Firstly, as indicated above, it has to be stressed that the factual setting of 
the case is of the utmost importance in adjudicating on how the judgment 
is to be interpreted as well as what the ambit of its application is likely to 
be. The facts of the matter having been dealt with in the aforegoing 
chapter, writer now moves to discuss the court‟s findings pertaining to the 
application of the law to those facts. 
Cloete JA, delivering a unanimous decision of court, started off by 
pointing out that the Commissioner did not seek to tax the actual receipt 
of loan capital and expressed the court‟s opinion that such receipt cannot 
be seen as a receipt for gross income purposes, citing the cases of Genn 
and Felix Schuh in support of this finding. It would therefore be safe to 
accept, writer submits, that the court has hereby confirmed that the 
receipt of a loan of money is excluded, not merely on the basis of its 
apparent capital nature. It fails the test on an earlier hurdle, namely the 
receipt-accrual part of the definition. 
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The court identifies the right that the Commissioner sought to tax as “the 
right to retain and use the loan capital, interest-free”, which right, so the 
argument went, had an ascertainable money value and which had 
accrued to the companies. 
In order to give effect to one of the tax court‟s rules of court, which 
Brummeria (“the appellants”) had failed to comply with, the court refused 
to hear a belated attempted argument by the appellants that the right the 
Commissioner had assessed was of a capital nature. 
In paragraph [9] of its judgment the court came to the crisp issue, which 
is also the focal point of this paper. It denotes this issue as being 
“whether the rights to use the loans interest free constituted „amounts‟ 
which „accrued to‟ the companies”. The court confirmed the correctness 
of what was said by the courts in Lategan, People‟s Stores and Cactus 
Investments in so far as it laid down the interpretation to be given the 
above two parts (expressed in bold) of the gross income definition. 
As early as paragraph [12] of the judgment, the court pronounces on the 
issue to be decided. Its finding in this regard reads as follows: 
“… the right to retain and use the borrowed funds without 
paying interest had a money value, and accordingly [ ] the 
value of such right must be included in the companies‟ gross 
incomes for the years in which such rights accrued to the 
companies.” 
The rest of the judgment (that part of it relevant to the issue under 
discussion) is devoted to the court‟s reasoning for the decision it came to. 
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The very first assertion made by the court was that the making of an 
interest-free loan constitutes a continuing donation to the borrower – 
conferring a benefit on him. As authority for this statement the court cited 
the case of CIR v Berold31. Berold‟s case was of course decided in the 
context of legislation similar to the current section 7(3) of the Act. The 
taxpayer in this case had sold a large number of valuable assets on credit 
and furthermore did not charge any interest on the purchase price. 
According to the court the taxpayer in effect lent the purchase price to the 
purchaser (borrower) and stated that ”… as long as he refrained from 
compelling Luzen to repay that sum, there was a continuing donation by 
him to Luzen of the interest on that loan.” 
It is submitted that the above quoted extract, as it was expressed in the 
sphere of section 7‟s deemed income rules, should not find any 
application in the context of the gross income definition, to determine 
whether an amount has been received or has accrued to a borrower of an 
interest-free loan. In any event, it seems that the main purpose of the 
court‟s reference to Berold was to make the point that the failure on the 
part of the lender to charge interest on a loan could be construed as a 
benefit in the hands of the borrower. This may or may not be found to be 
so in a given set of facts and circumstances under section 7(3). 
The court then took somewhat of a leap in its reasoning. From having just 
asserted that the absence of an interest obligation could be a benefit, the 
immediate next conclusion reached was that in the modern commercial 
world a right to retain and use loan capital interest-free is a valuable right. 
What to writer‟s mind was not considered is the interim question, namely 
whether this “right to retain and use loan capital interest-free” is a right 
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which constitutes property in the hands of the appellants (in accordance 
with the Lategan principle). 
As discussed at length in the previous chapter, not every right or receipt 
of a tax subject will necessarily constitute an amount otherwise than in 
cash, i.e. a right which must be included in gross income. It does not go 
without saying that if a certain contractual obligation is not laid on a tax 
subject, that such absence of an obligation constitutes a subjective 
personal or real right in his hands. Even more so, writer submits, if such 
obligation is something which would not exist except if the parties called it 
into life by contracting therefore, as in the case of interest on a loan, 
where neither the common law nor statute compels the charging of 
interest on a loan of money. 
Having accepted that the right the Commissioner sought to tax was a 
right such as necessitates inclusion in gross income, the court turned to 
the second leg of the Lategan principle – whether the right has a money 
value or is of such a nature that a value can be attached to it in money. 
The court considered the appellants‟ submission that the rights assessed 
by the Commissioner could not be turned into money and could therefore 
be distinguished from the court‟s decision in People‟s Stores. This 
submission was based on the Cape High Court‟s decision in Stander. In 
dispelling their argument the court found that the question whether a 
receipt in a form other than money has a money value is the primary 
enquiry and its susceptibility to be turned into money is but a way of 
coming to an answer to the primary question.  
The court thus affirmed the approach adopted in the Ochberg case 
regarding the nature of the test for the valuation of rights (i.e. receipts 
otherwise than in cash). Granted, the question in the last-mentioned case 
was slightly different from the issue in Brummeria. That court was faced 
with an argument that the taxpayer did not derive any benefit from the 
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share rights received and consequently had not received an amount. As 
was the case in Brummeria, the court in Ochberg came to the conclusion 
that an objective test had to be applied to determine whether the receipt 
of a right had a money value. If, because of the appellant‟s specific 
circumstances, the right would have little value in his hands (in economic 
terms) or if he was unable to convert it into money, such considerations 
would be of no consequence to the enquiry of the court. 
Stander‟s case was accordingly rejected and the principles formulated 
therein held to be incorrect in so far as it contradicted the court‟s findings. 
For the same reasons the ratio of Conradie J‟s judgment in ITC 701 was 
found to be the correct interpretation of the law. The court, still in dealing 
with the basis for the taxability of receipts and accruals otherwise than in 
cash, then quoted a statement by Hefer JA in People‟s Stores in support 
of its findings. The relevant part of the quotation reads: 
“It is hardly conceivable that the Legislature could not have 
been aware of, or would have turned a blind eye to, the 
handsome profits often reaped from commercial transactions 
in which money is not the medium of exchange. Consider, 
for example, the many instances of valuable property 
changing hands, not for money, but for shares in public or 
private companies; or share-croppings agreements, 
dividends in the form of bonus shares, or remuneration for 
services in the form of free or subsidised housing and the 
use of motor vehicles. These are only a few of the many 
possible illustrations that readily come to mind and which, as 
we know, have not been overlooked by the Legislature.” 
In dispelling the appellants‟ argument that the above underlined phrase 
should be interpreted to mean that only benefits falling within the 
provisions of paragraph (i) of gross income and the Seventh Schedule to 
the Act, are taxable, the court formulated its answer as follows: 
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“Those provisions were inserted into the Act not because 
such benefits are not otherwise taxable, but to put beyond 
doubt what benefits are taxable and, equally important, to 
determine how their value is to be assessed for the purpose 
of calculating the tax to be deducted by an employer from an 
employee‟s remuneration.” 
Having agreed with the Commissioner‟s submissions and rejected those 
of the appellants, the court then shifted the focus of its reasons for 
judgment to the contrary findings made by the tax court a quo. The SCA 
rejected the finding that the Commissioner had assessed the appellants 
on notional income. The court remarked32 that the appellants were 
assessed on the basis of the benefit inherent in the right to use the loans 
without having to pay interest on them (own emphasis). According to the 
court no double taxation would arise if the appellants had invested the 
loan monies to earn an interest yield, as in such a case two separate 
receipts or accruals of gross income would result. 
3.2 The ratio decidendi 
It is important to determine whether the SCA‟s judgment in the 
Brummeria case has developed the law relating to the interpretation of 
the phrase an amount otherwise than in cash received by or accrued to a 
person. And if so, to what extent has it done so and what would be the 
ambit of its application. 
In order to come to definitive answers with regards to the above-
mentioned, one needs to first establish what parts of the judgment 
amounts to ratio decidendi – the court‟s reasons for judgment – and 
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which are merely obiter dicta – comments made or views expressed by 
the court in the course of its reasoning but which does not relate directly 
to the decision come to on the issues addressed by the court. The ratio 
decidendi would usually be binding on later court cases dealing with the 
same questions of law, except if such later cases are distinguishable on 
its particular facts. This binding power of decisions of higher courts on 
cases heard in lower courts is referred to as the principle of stare decisis. 
The obiter dicta of a particular judgment however do not have any binding 
power over lower courts. Hence the importance of distinguishing clearly 
between the two. 
Writer does not consider the court‟s assumption that the right in casu was 
necessarily a „right‟ for purposes of gross income, as one of its binding 
pronouncements. This matter was not argued before the court at all. 
Neither was it addressed specifically by the court in its judgment. It 
therefore remains an issue open for argument in any future case. Writer 
will discuss this issue in some more detail below33. 
The first point that the court specifically decided upon was whether the 
right in casu had an ascertainable money value or was capable of being 
valued in money. Writer submits that pinning a monetary value on an 
accrued right will be possible in most cases. This would be the case an 
account of what was said in People‟s Stores with reference to Lace 
Proprietary Mines Ltd v CIR34, namely that although the valuation may 
sometimes be a matter of considerable complexity, this would not detract 
from the principle that all income having a money value must be included 
in gross income. Further authority for the above assertion is the ratio of 
the courts‟ findings in the cases of Ochberg and ITC 701. Finding a 
monetary value for the accrual of a right of a revenue nature will 
henceforth be an objective enquiry. Thus, even if the only valuation 
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available is the value of a right in the open market, this would be a 
sufficient method of valuing the specific right in question. 
As Van Blerck puts it on the second page of his analysis of the 
judgment35:  
“Once the SCA overlooked the key point in (a) [whether the 
arrangement constituted a right accruing to Brummeria], the 
answer to point (b) [whether that right was capable of being 
valued in money] was a slam dunk. Since the only serious 
contention before the SCA was the determination of the 
ascertainable money value of the apparent interest-free 
„right‟, and since SARS came up with a calculation 
acceptable to the judge, and which was not disputed by the 
taxpayer, that was that.” 
To amplify this point even more, Brummeria has now once and for all 
done away with what was previously perceived to be a requirement for a 
right to qualify as gross income, namely that the taxpayer had to be able 
to turn into money the receipt or accrual in question. Stander‟s case and 
Delfos to the extent that it could be interpreted to hold a view contrary to 
the accepted principles laid down in Lategan, People‟s Stores and Cactus 
Investments, have been overruled and should no longer be able to assist 
tax subjects in this regard. 
Brummeria has arguably not done anything to extend the accepted 
interpretation of the term accrued to or in favour of in the gross income 
definition. 
The part of the judgment relating to paragraph (i) of „gross income‟ and 
the Seventh Schedule of the Act, it is submitted, does not strictly form 
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part of the ratio of the decision as it did not bear either directly or 
indirectly to the question of law to be answered by the court. Even if it 
was possible to establish an indirect link between the remark of the court 
in this regard and the decision to which the court ultimately came to on 
the issues before it, it is further submitted that such link is remote to such 
an extent that it would not be binding on a court dealing with the same 
issues in a subsequent case. 
The most controversial statement of the whole judgment, in writer‟s 
opinion, is found in paragraph [12] thereof and reads as follows: 
“Indeed, it can hardly be doubted that, in the modern 
commercial world, a right to retain and use loan capital for a 
period of time, interest-free, is a valuable right.” 
Whether this statement can be said to be part of the ratio decidendi or 
not, is not wholly clear to writer‟s mind. Were it not for the court‟s rather 
circumspect introduction to the remark, i.e. “Indeed, it can hardly be 
doubted that,…”, it might have been less difficult to determine whether 
this statement is part of the ratio of the decision. For one, respected tax 
expert and senior counsel, David Meyerowitz, is of the opinion that this 
pronouncement by the court does not form part of the ratio decidendi of 
Brummeria36. Writer respectfully supports this view. The question whether 
the alleged right sought to be taxed by SARS was indeed a „right‟, in the 
sense of an amount otherwise than in cash necessitating inclusion in 
gross income (see Lategan‟s case with regards to which non-cash 
receipts and accruals would constitute an amount for gross income37), 
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was not one of the issues in dispute and as the court was not requested 
or obliged to rule thereon, writer submits that the above controversial 
quotation does not form part of the court‟s findings and/or reasons for 
judgment. 
The other line of reasoning which caused somewhat of a disturbance to 
writer‟s mind was the SCA‟s answers to the tax court‟s findings. These 
pronouncements were in effect an application by the court of its own 
reasons for the decision it came to on the issues, to certain conclusions 
reached by the tax court. These dicta do therefore not have the strength 
of stare decisis, but will nonetheless be available to litigating parties in 
future when in need of authoritative ammunition to dispel of the issues of 
notional and double taxation in a factual setting similar to that of 
Brummeria. 
3.3 A critical discussion of the SCA’s decision in the Brummeria 
case 
Before coming to a discussion in the next chapter of what the likely 
impact of the Brummeria judgment would be on the income tax treatment 
of interest-free loans in the hands of the borrower, it would be prudent to 
take a critical look at the SCA‟s decision as a whole. The purpose 
herewith is to highlight what writer perceives to be the most crucial 
matters to bear in mind in determining the ambit of the judgment‟s impact. 
Drawing on the discussion in the previous chapter regarding the legal 
nature of loan for consumption – the contract type that the South African 
monetary loan belongs to – as well as the interpretation given to the 
respective parts that make up the „gross income‟ definition, the following 
remarks are of key significance: 
 The SCA did not venture into an enquiry into whether the rights on 
which the Commissioner based his assessments indeed 
constituted rights that are susceptible to inclusion in gross income. 
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It should be borne in mind that the appellants did not raise this as 
an issue to be decided upon by the court. Had they done so, the 
decision may have been substantially different. 
 The court would then have had to take cognisance of the fact that 
in a contract for the loan of money, which is governed by the 
common law, the borrower in reality becomes the owner of the 
monies lent at the moment of receipt thereof. Included in the right 
of ownership is, amongst a host of other competencies, the basic 
freedom of every owner of a thing to do with or use the thing (in 
this case money) as he/she pleases. In the case of a loan of 
money no separation exists between ownership and rights of use 
enjoyed by the borrower. Take for example the case where 
someone acquires ownership of a residential property. Included in 
his ownership right is the competency to make use of his property. 
If he should choose to live in it, i.e. use it as his place of residence, 
such use would not have any fiscal implications for him. If however 
on the other hand he should choose to employ the property in his 
residential letting business, concluding a lease contract with a 
tenant who remunerates him for the right of use, he (the owner) 
would be taxable on the rental income received. 
 Without employing his capital in the above-mentioned manner, the 
owner would not be open to an attack from the Revenue on the 
basis that apart from receiving ownership in the property (most 
likely a capital receipt), he has also received a further benefit, 
namely „the right to use the property as his place of residence 
without having to pay any rental‟. There is only one receipt by the 
owner – he receives the right of ownership in the property. 
Included therein are all the competencies intrinsic to or inherent in 
ownership. As owner he can use, alienate, destroy or do nothing 
with his property. 
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 In the same manner the recipient of loan capital becomes owner 
thereof. There is no separate, further receipt at some other point of 
a right to use the loan. As owner of the money he has the right to 
use it and this competency was included in the receipt of the loan 
capital, which the SCA in Brummeria acknowledged is not a 
receipt for the purposes of gross income. Bearing this in mind, 
writer submits that the critical part of the right identified by the 
SCA, namely the right to retain and use the borrowed funds 
without paying interest, is not the first part, but indeed the last 
(underlined phrase). It is the fact that the taxpayer did not need to 
pay interest on the borrowed funds which caused the receipt to be 
a taxable one, allegedly falling into the gross income of the 
appellants. 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, there rests no obligation on 
a lender – neither in the common law, nor from statute – to charge 
interest when lending out money. If the parties to a loan contract 
therefore agree that the loan would not be interest-bearing, they 
have merely stated the default position, because if they did not 
have an agreement with regards to interest, the law would have 
imputed to their arrangement the same consequences. A loan of 
money, which does not make provision for the charging of interest, 
would be non-interest bearing (interest-free). 
 Writer finds it difficult to accept that if an obligation, which would 
not otherwise have been present (or part of an agreement at all) 
had it not specifically been contracted for, were to be absent from 
a contract of loan, how this could automatically translate into the 
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receipt of a right by the borrower of an amount equal to that which 
he would have been obliged to pay had he been obligated to pay 
it38. No doubt, seen in the context of a capitalistic commercial 
world, the terms of such agreement would be seen to be to the 
benefit of such borrower. But such benefit, which is based on the 
absence of the obligation to pay interest, it is submitted by writer, 
would not necessarily equate to the receipt of a right for the 
purposes of „gross income‟ by the borrower39. 
 The critical view taken by writer in the above two bulleted points 
deals with matters not argued before and thus not specifically 
addressed by the SCA, but they are nonetheless crucial in coming 
to a definitive understanding of the merits and scope of the SCA‟s 
decision. As the SCA‟s enquiry was based on the assumption that 
there was a right for purposes of the gross income definition, 
which right accrued to the appellants – such receipt being a receipt 
for the purposes of „gross income‟ – their enquiry really only 
commenced thereafter. Writer therefore agrees with the court‟s 
reasoning from that point on and thus with the finding of the court 
on the facts, although writer does not necessarily agree with the 
income tax treatment ultimately afforded to the appellant 
borrowers. 
3.4 SARS: Draft Interpretation Note40 
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During October 2008 the Revenue authority issued a Draft Interpretation 
Note with regards to the Brummeria Case, the focus of it being the 
correct treatment of „the right to use loan capital interest-free‟ for 
purposes of the definition of „gross income‟ in section 1 of the Act. On 
page 2 of the draft note41 SARS gives its interpretation of what it 
perceives to be the ratio decidendi of the judgment. It singles out the 
following principles: 
 the case is authority for the proposition that the right to use loan 
capital interest-free has a monetary value. Writer has already aired 
his views on this issue in the critical discussion of the decision (in 
3.3 above); 
 although the right in casu cannot be alienated or turned into 
money, such state of affairs does not negate the fact that the right 
has a money value. An objective, not subjective, test should be 
applied to determine whether the receipt has a money value and if 
so, what the value of the receipt is. The case of Stander on this 
point was overturned; 
 the principles enunciated in the cases of Lategan, People‟s Stores 
and Cactus Investments were confirmed to correctly reflect the 
interpretation of the law; 
 it is not necessary that a benefit of this nature fall within the 
provisions of paragraph (i) of „gross income‟ in order to render it 
taxable. 
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In point 442 the Revenue concedes that the judgment of the SCA in 
Brummeria did not specifically deal with (and can therefore not be cited 
as authority):  
- whether the accrual in question was of a capital nature, 
- the timing of the accrual; and 
- the valuation method applied by the Commissioner. 
3.5 Conclusion  
The discussion undertaken in this chapter has borne out the binding 
principles to be gathered from the Brummeria judgment. These principles, 
which are a mixture of the court‟s findings on the issues brought before it 
for decision and the reasons given by the court for coming to such 
findings (the ratio decidendi) have power to bind lower courts by virtue of 
the application of the maxim stare decisis. The extent of the application of 
these principles is a matter of interpretation. How to interpret the decision 
of the SCA has been the topic of many a discussion between tax experts 
and has also been addressed in multiple articles and papers by 
commentators and practitioners. In the next chapter of this discussion 
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4 CHAPTER 4:  The impact of the binding principles of the 
Brummeria case and the application thereof to selected 
interest-free loans (and consequent treatment – post-
Brummeria) 
4.1 Introduction: Manifestations of the interest-free loan 
The main and most important question that needs to be answered 
following the decision of the SCA in C: SARS v Brummeria Renaissance 
(Pty) Ltd, is how it is to be interpreted and what its likely scope of 
application will be. How wide-ranging is its impact going to be? 
Various commentators and experts in the field of tax practice have over 
the course of the past year braved the uncertain waters to stake their 
views of this particular matter. In coming to an ultimate conclusion of his 
own, writer will now endeavour to put forward the opinions expressed by 
some of the leading minds of the South African tax practitioners‟ 
fraternity. Most of the opinions expressed can be grouped into two wide 
„schools of thought‟ regarding the implications of the Brummeria case. On 
the one hand there are those who believe (or who fear) that it is an „in 
principle‟ decision, capable of wide import and applicable to the whole 
range of interest-free loan transactions encountered in practice. On the 
other hand there are those who are of the opinion that the decision has to 
be confined to its own particular set of facts and that it would only be 
applicable to cases with a similar factual and contractual setting.  
Whatever the correct interpretation, one thing both schools of thought 
hold in common, namely the concern regarding how (to what extent, if at 
all) the principles coming out of the judgment in Brummeria will impact 
upon the most common manifestations of interest-free loans in 
commercial transactions. Will the Revenue attempt to apply these 
principles on a wider scale? 
Some of the types of interest-free loans regularly observed in practice 
that require consideration in view of the judgment, are the following: 
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Loans between family members: Most notably these include 
borrowings flowing from a father to an adult child. The underlying motives 
for such loans are usually the offering of financial assistance to enable 
the child to set up a business or to further develop an existing one or to 
fund an academic education. In other circumstances it might purely be a 
measure to maintain the child during a time of personal financial difficulty 
or to finance a basic necessity, e.g. the acquisition of a primary residence 
or motor vehicle. 
Shareholder loans or loans by members to a close corporation: This 
application of the interest-free loan is a well-known and highly popular 
mechanism used by business men in the small business milieu to 
capitalise their businesses. This method of funding business operations is 
regularly preferred above taking up equity in the enterprises concerned 
as it represents a much less cumbersome way to in future extract funds 
out of the business. In the case of equity, the business owner as 
shareholder of his company or member of a close corporation is 
confronted with stringent company law rules to either repay capital or 
declare dividends and is hit by an extra taxing charge in the form of either 
secondary tax on companies (“STC”) or dividends withholding tax 
(“DWT”). Although this method of funding corporate operations is contra-
productive in a sense for the Receiver of Revenue (on account of the 
foregone potential STC or DWT), it is nonetheless widespread in practice 
and accepted by Revenue. Its use is usually a welcome stimulus to 
commercial growth in South Africa, which in the long run should translate 
to a stronger economy and higher levels of aggregate taxable business 
profits. 
Interest-free loans by the founder/donor of an inter vivos trust: It is 
often encountered in practice that the founder of a trust would transfer a 
valuable asset (e.g. shares or immovable property) out of his personal 
estate to the trust on loan account. Alternatively, the founder would 
transfer monies, i.e. make a loan for consumption to the trust in order to 
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capitalise the trust and for it in return to invest the money in order to grow 
its income earning capacity. 
Intra-company interest-free loans (between group companies): The 
use of interest-free loans or loan accounts to transfer holdings or assets 
between companies forming part of the same corporate group is a further 
common occurrence. Group holding companies often extend interest-free 
loans to operating subsidiaries to strengthen their capital structure in 
order to expand their business operations. Other popular reasons for 
extending an interest-free loan in this milieu are to provide ad-hoc 
financing to enable the subsidiary to acquire some or other critical asset / 
business enterprise or during an initial loss making period of a new 
venture. 
With the exception of the two mentioned examples of interest-free loans 
creating an income tax liability at the moment of transacting for the loan, 
i.e. situations covered by either section 7 of the Act or paragraph (i) of the 
gross income definition read with the Seventh Schedule of the Act, 
interest-free loan transactions (including the above-mentioned four 
categories) had up until the decision in the Brummeria case not attracted 
any adverse fiscal consequences. 
As Spring43 notes, with reference to tax adviser, Costa Divaris: 
”Under the income tax law there is no provision deeming 
interest to accrue on such a loan [i.e. an interest-free loan]. 
Nor does such loan involve a donation for donations tax 
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purposes. Specific legislation would be required to change 
this position, whose validity is widely accepted.” 
To draw nearer to a conclusion regarding whether the judgment in 
Brummeria will have the effect of upsetting the views held above, the two 
„schools of thought‟ which have developed around the scope of its 
applicability will now be examined with reference to its major exponents. 
4.2 The ‘in principle’ school 
Ernest Mazansky, Tax Director at Werksmans Tax is of the view44 that 
even though the right to use interest-free loan capital would, in the normal 
course, give rise to an amount accrued, it should in the majority of cases 
be excluded from gross income on the basis that it constitutes a receipt of 
a capital nature. Mazansky‟s view therefore seems to be in favour of an 
application of the Brummeria principles to all interest-free loans, but so he 
argues, this would usually only lead to tax in the borrower‟s hands if the 
loan had been granted as quid pro quo for the supply by borrower of 
goods, services or other similar trade facility. 
Professional services editor for Business Day, Sanchia Temkin, in an 
article posted during October 200745 relays the views of University of 
Kwa-Zulu Natal tax expert, Bob Williams, who is reported to have said 
that the judgment in Brummeria did not lay down a rule that all interest-
free loans would give rise to a tax liability for the borrower.  According to 
Williams an income tax liability will only ensue if the interest-free loan is a 
benefit of a revenue nature to the borrower, for example where it is 
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received in the course of carrying on a business or in the course of a 
scheme of profit making. 
Professional services firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers, aired a view in their 
monthly tax publication, Synopsis, for October 2007. The following 
extracts are of relevance46: 
“The Brummeria judgment does not lay down a blanket rule 
that an interest-free loan is always a taxable benefit in the 
hands of the borrower.” … It is submitted that the presence 
or absence of a quid pro quo for the loan is not the critical 
issue. What is decisive is whether the benefit in question 
[the value of the right to have the use of the money without 
paying interest] is of a revenue or capital nature.” 
The article later on refers to the double taxation which would result in the 
hands of the borrower by applying the Brummeria principle and as a 
result a plea is made for a distinction to be drawn between an interest-
free loan received as remuneration for the supply of goods or services 
and those received without consideration. 
Cilliers47, on page 185 of his article, remarks that the ratio of the case 
appears to lie largely at the level of principle as it was not really 
dependent on the peculiar facts of the case and further48: 
“… To those who (like me) see in Brummeria an in-principle 
decision rather than one that can readily be confined to its 
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own facts, its impact, at first blush at least, appears to be 
almost incredibly far-reaching.” 
In Taxation Principles of Interest and other Financing Transactions49 the 
editor refers to the views aired by Ernst & Young National Technical 
Director, David Clegg, namely that there was no apparent technical 
reason why the principles established in the Brummeria case should not 
be applicable to all forms or arrangement, both commercial and private. 
4.3 The ‘quid pro quo’ school 
Silke50 discussing barter and exchange transactions51 says that where an 
asset is exchanged for another, the value of the new asset would be 
gross income if the old asset was held as trading stock and as so long as 
the new asset constitutes an amount received or accrued with a money 
value. On 2 – 23, in discussing the facts of the Brummeria case, the 
assertion is made that the life-long right to occupation was the quid pro 
quo for the continuing making of the loan. Although technically unsound 
with regards to the ongoing making available of the loan and legal nature 
of a loan for consumption, this source is of the view that the arrangement 
in Brummeria was one of exchange and that the tax liability of the 
borrower arose as a result of the parties‟ specific arrangement to this 
effect. 
Temkin, in the same article referred to above52, reports the opinion of 
Anton Kriel, tax director of BDO Spencer Steward. Kriel remarks that the 
facts resulting in the judgment were very specific and that they clearly 
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indicate a barter transaction had been entered into between the parties. 
Consequently, Kriel is of the view that a loan without a quid pro quo 
would be safe from any income tax liability. 
Van Blerck in his analysis of the implications of Brummeria remarks that 
SARS is likely to attempt to tax interest-free loans where there is a clear 
quid pro quo for the loan and such quid pro quo appears to be a receipt 
of a revenue nature in the hands of the borrower. 
Professor Henry Vorster53 airs the view that “… the Court did not 
establish any new principle or approach to interest-free loans.” According 
to him the factual and contractual (quid pro quo) circumstances 
distinguishes it from other interest-free loan transactions (most notably 
those listed above by writer). Vorster takes his point further by noting that 
even if there were an income tax relevant benefit derived by a borrower 
from an interest-free loan, such benefit would be of a capital nature. 
Professor Emile Brincker holds the opinion that the reach of the SCA‟s 
judgment54 is not as extensive as initially anticipated by many. According 
to Brincker the case is quite fact specific on account of the quid pro quo 
for the granting of the loan and would thus not be readily applicable to all 
interest-free or low interest rate loans. 
4.4 SARS: Draft Interpretation Note55 
In point 5 of their draft note the Revenue authority gives their views as to 
the ambit of application of the binding principles from the SCA‟s decision 
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in Brummeria. Their first assertion is that the judgment will find 
application where benefits in a form other than money are granted in 
exchange, i.e. as quid pro quo, for goods supplied, services rendered or 
any other benefit given. It thus confirms that where an interest-free loan is 
given as consideration for the revenue earning activities of a borrower – 
whether it be the selling of trading stock or the rendering of a service – 
the receipt of the interest-free loan will result in an amount accruing to the 
borrower. 
SARS furthermore concedes that the use of the weighted average prime 
overdraft rate in order to determine the value of the right to use loan 
capital interest-free is not necessarily the most appropriate method of 
calculating the value of such right. They specifically indicate that: 
“Each case should be evaluated on its own merits and all 
facts and circumstances … should be taken into account in 
the valuation.” 
SARS did not want give any guidance or lay down any guidelines with 
regards to the timing of the accrual as regards interest-free loans 
generally and merely state that it should be determined in accordance 
with the general principles of our law, having due regard to the facts and 
circumstances of each individual case. 
More important is SARS‟s pronouncement on the application of the 
Brummeria principles in the context of loans between group companies 
and loans by shareholders to their companies. In this regard SARS 
remark that these loans may only be affected by the Brummeria case to 
the extent that the interest-free loans are received in exchange for (thus 
as quid pro quo for) services rendered or goods supplied by the borrower 
to the lender. In the opinion of SARS these loans will mostly be granted in 
a capital context and would therefore not be hit by the judgment. 
4.5 Conclusion 
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The SCA‟s decision in the Brummeria case has the potential to find 
application in the widest possible sense, that is, to all interest-free loan 
transactions encountered in the market place as well as in the private 
sphere. The main reason for the risk of this potential across-the-board 
application is the fact that the wording of the SCA‟s judgment is couched 
in such general terms that it is difficult to justify the limitation thereof to 
the very specific factual bounds within which the decision was delivered. 
As a result, any enquiry into the correct or most likely interpretation of the 
judgment becomes an equally difficult task. One‟s interpretation of the 
judgment would of course furnish one‟s evaluation of the ambit of its 
application. 
It is therefore no wonder that the taxing fraternity finds itself divided on 
this issue, as clearly observed from the expert opinions cited above56. 
The division centres around the question of whether the judgment could 
be or should be confined to its own particular facts or if there is scope to 
apply it to all interest-free loans. 
The major problem for all tax subjects and practitioners – with regards to 
the application of Brummeria to interest-free loans in general – is the 
court‟s statement in paragraph [12] of its judgment, which reads: 
“Indeed, it can hardly be doubted that, in the modern 
commercial world, a right to retain and use loan capital for a 
period of time, interest-free, is a valuable right.” 
If it is accepted that this statement is part of the court‟s ratio decidendi, 
then, writer submits, Brummeria could have a major impact on interest-
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free loans in general. It would then be difficult to argue – accepting that 
the „right to retain and use loan capital interest-free‟ could be a separate 
right57 received by or accrued to the borrower of an interest-free loan – 
that such right does not accrue to all tax subjects borrowing money 
interest-free. 
One would be able to make an argument at such point that the 
Brummeria case was decided in the context of a quid pro quo of a 
revenue nature being given by the borrower, in return for which he 
received the interest-free loan. This should be a strong argument and 
writer is inclined to agree with the experts who espouse it, especially in 
the light of the revenue authority‟s Draft Interpretation Note – which adds 
more weight to the argument. An addition, it would be possible, in certain 
circumstances, to argue that the borrower‟s receipt or accrual is of a 
capital nature. 
In the discussed above58 writer has given his considered opinion of what 
constitutes the ratio of the judgment and is writer for the most part in 
agreement with the binding principles identified by SARS in their Draft 
Interpretation Note59. Notwithstanding his previously expressed 
misgivings, writer will accept, for purposes of the discussion to follow 
(and to take a conservative approach), that the quoted extract from the 
case (above) is indeed one of the decided binding principles of the case. 
In applying the principles stated in the Draft Interpretation Note to the four 
classes of ordinary or every day interest-free loans, namely shareholder 
loans to companies, inter-company loans in a group, loans within a family 
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context and those made to inter vivos trusts, writer draws the following 
conclusions: 
The first principle, namely that „the right to use loan capital interest-free 
has a monetary value‟ (“the right”) will only have an impact if in a tax 
appeal against an assessment by SARS on this ground, the 
Commissioner would be able to prove that the right does indeed have an 
independent existence from the granting of the loan/receipt of (the 
ownership in) the loan capital. And even then – if the tax subject is hit by 
this principle – a further argument can be made that although such right 
exists independently from the ownership rights in the loan capital, which 
right has a monetary value, such right cannot be said to have been 
received by or accrued to the tax subject, as the absence of an obligation 
to pay interest does not automatically translate to a receipt or accrual in 
the hands of the borrower. The latter argument would be much weaker 
once the former has fallen. The last resort would be (as discussed above) 
to argue that there is no quid pro quo situation present in the tax subject‟s 
set of facts and circumstances and/or that the accrual is of a capital 
nature. 
The second principle – how to ascertain whether a receipt or accrual has 
a money value – would of course have an adverse impact on the 
borrower of an interest-free loan who is assessed on this basis. No longer 
is an argument available to a tax subject that no money value exists to 
the extent that the right in question cannot be turned into money. 
Brummeria has arguably overturned Stander in this regard and confirmed 
that the test for placing a value on a receipt otherwise than in cash is an 
objective one (per Ochberg  and ITC 701). There may however be room 
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for an argument that the value of a right may be less if it cannot readily be 
turned into money. 
The third and fourth principles60 would not have an impact on the income 
tax treatment of a borrower of an interest-free loan as the third amounts 
to a mere confirmation of the interpretation of the law as it stood prior to 
Brummeria and the fourth is not applicable to it. 
Writer is therefore of the opinion that such binding principles (i.e. SARS‟ 
interpretation of the ratio decidendi in the Brummeria case) would only 
have the effect of bringing every day interest-free loan transactions into 
the sphere of taxability to the extent indicated above. 
---000--- 
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5 CHAPTER 5:  Arguments against a possible SARS-attack on 
the basis of Brummeria 
In the above chapters writer has investigated and drawn conclusions 
regarding some of the most contentious issues that have been plaguing 
the South African tax world since the advent of the SCA‟s judgment in the 
Brummeria case. Writer has expounded and established his opinion on 
how amounts otherwise than in cash which may have been received by 
or accrued to a particular tax subject are to be treated in the context of an 
interest-free loan receipt (which is of course not a receipt for gross 
income purposes61) and in the light of the principles enunciated by the 
court in Brummeria. 
The question however still beckons as to what a tax subject, hit by an 
assessed by SARS on the basis of the principles laid down in the 
judgment, will be able to argue in order to successfully avert such an 
attack. The answer hereto is two-fold. The size and weight of the tax 
subject‟s arsenal will depend on the gravity of the attack launched against 
it, i.e. whether the assessment to tax is based on a limited scope 
interpretation of the judgment or rather a wide-ranging application of the 
judgment. 
5.1 Limited scope attack 
In the first instance it may be the case that SARS assesses the tax 
subject on the basis that its factual and contractual circumstances mirror 
the position of the companies in the Brummeria case. 
For purposes of the discussion, the following example will be used: 
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Company A made an interest-free loan available to financially struggling 
Company B (assume that a possible group relationship is irrelevant for 
present purposes). In return for the loan, Company B (e.g. a retail 
clothing store) rewarded Company A with a right – a first option to buy 
Company B‟s business as a going concern if the interest-free loan proves 
to not have the desired effect of lifting Company B out of tumultuous 
financial waters. Assume for present purposes that the option price would 
be such that a benefit more or less equal to the interest-free benefit 
would apply to the lender. The loan was made in 2004 and was for an 
amount of R1,000,000. Company B‟s financial year-end is 28 February. 
In March 2005 the Commissioner assessed Company B for tax on the 
loan capital receipt from Company A. Company B objects to this 
assessment, citing the cases of Genn and Felix Schuh as authority that 
this receipt is not a receipt for purposes of the „gross income‟ definition. 
The Commissioner accordingly withdraws the assessment. 
During November 2008 Company B receives a revised (additional) 
assessment for income tax from the Commissioner. The assessment 
states that Company B has received amounts otherwise than in cash, 
which is the right to use and retain the loan capital without having to pay 
interest thereon. This benefit, so the grounds of assessment read, was 
received in exchange (i.e. as a quid pro quo) for the supply by Company 
B to Company A of a first option to purchase the business of Company B 
if they should decide to sell it. 
Based on the principles laid down by the SCA in the Brummeria case, 
SARS argues that the benefit received by Company B has a money value 
which has accrued to Company B on an annual basis in an amount equal 
to the calculated value determined by multiplying the outstanding loan 
amount with the weighted prime overdraft rate of banks. The calculation 
is therefore: R1,000,000 X annualised overdraft rate, for each year of 
assessment, i.e. 2005 – 2008. 
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Writer assumes for present purposes that the parties agree that the 
Brummeria case finds limited application – i.e. only to quid pro quo 
situations. Writer further assumes that the controversial statement in the 
case, referred to above, is part of the case‟s ratio decidendi and is 
binding on the tax subject. What arguments can be advanced in an 
appeal against a rejected objection to the assessment? 
Firstly, the tax subject would be well advised to take cognisance of the 
principles that stand firm, i.e. which cannot be disputed as the ratio of the 
Brummeria case has dispelled therewith. These can be summarised as 
follows: 
 There is a non-cash right (i.e. property for purposes of gross 
income) to interest-free funding.  
 The right can be valued in money, has an ascertainable money 
value. 
 The right has accrued to the company in consideration (exchange) 
for – i.e. as quid pro quo for – the right of first option to purchase 
the business of Company A.  (There is therefore no doubt that 
Brummeria applies.) 
The arguments to be made on behalf of the company could be the 
following: 
In the first instance it would be prudent to challenge the timing of the 
accrual to the company. Thus, not disputing that there was an accrual of 
a right to the company, but rather arguing that such right accrued once 
and for all to the company on receipt of the loan capital. The basis of 
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such argument would be the legal nature of a monetary loan. As 
discussed in chapter 262 the only obligation that a lender has in terms of a 
loan of money, is to transfer ownership in the money to the borrower. By 
transferring the ownership in the loan capital, it transfers all the rights or 
competencies that make up the bundle of all-encompassing rights that 
comprises „ownership‟.63 Once it has performed in accordance with this 
obligation it has no further obligations to fulfil in terms of the agreement. 
By taking cognisance of the lender‟s obligations in terms of the contract it 
is clear that there cannot be an annual accrual of a right (the right to use 
and retain loan monies interest-free) to the borrower as its rights under 
the contract are merely the flipside of the lender‟s obligations. Its rights 
can therefore not be more than or different at all for that matter from the 
lender‟s obligations. To put it slightly differently, the borrower has 
received all the competencies included in the bundle of rights comprising 
ownership, the right to retain and use the loan capital as well, at the point 
in time when he received the loan capital.64 
If this reasoning were to be accepted it should stand on firm ground that 
the right in question has accrued in full to the borrower at the date of 
receipt of the loan capital, that is at the very beginning of the contract 
term or loan period – in 2004. The company would then be in an excellent 
position to argue that the Commissioner is precluded from raising all of 
the assessments (for each of the years of assessment from 2005 to 
2008) by virtue of the fact that it has prescribed in terms of section 79(1) 
of the Act. The company‟s argument is not that it had not received the 
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right that the Commissioner is seeking to tax. Rather, its argument is to 
the effect that it received the right in the very first year of assessment, for 
which the Commissioner‟s right to assess has prescribed, as explained 
hereunder. 
Section 79(1) dictates that the Commissioner shall not be allowed to raise 
an assessment if more than three years have elapsed since the date of 
the (original) assessment. The period can only be extended if the 
taxpayer was the cause for the Commissioner missing his deadline, by 
making himself guilty of fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure in 
connection with the amount sought to be taxed. As the last-mentioned 
three circumstances are assumed not to be present in this case and 
seeing as Brummeria specifically confirmed the application of section 
79(1) in a case similar to the example under discussion, the company 
should have a strong case to successfully appeal against the 
assessment. 
A second argument to be advanced on behalf of the taxpayer in these 
circumstances is that the valuation by the Commissioner of the right in 
question was wrong. To quote Meyerowitz in this regard (delivering a 
critique on the decision in Brummeria): 
“… an objective valuation of the right would have to take into 
account the fact the right carried with it the obligation to 
provide the lender with a life right, there would, in our 
opinion, have been no escape from the conclusion that the 
value of the right would be the difference, if any, between 
the market value of the use of the capital and the market 
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value of the right of occupation during the existence of the 
loan.”65 
Mazansky66 remarks in this regard that the value of the benefit is 
dependent upon the usefulness thereof to the borrower. According to 
him, in circumstances where the loan is repayable on demand or on short 
notice, the value of the benefit would necessarily be considerably less in 
the hands of the borrower. There is certainly merit in this view and an 
argument along these lines, if the particular loan terms allowed for it, 
would be a useful defensive weapon in the arsenal of a beleaguered 
borrower. 
Cilliers also draws attention to this issue in his article67 and notes that the 
prime overdraft rate may not be the rate at which the borrower would 
have been able to attain financing in the market – had he not been lent 
the funds at zero interest. The fact is that the borrower may have been 
able to obtain financing in the market at a rate several basis points below 
the prime overdraft rate of banks, meaning that borrowing at zero interest 
would not have a value to him which relates to the difference between the 
prime rate and a zero interest rate.  Cilliers refers to this way of valuing 
the right as the „cost saving‟ approach. 
It is likely that the above argument will be challenged by Revenue, 
namely that the Brummeria case has confirmed the principle enunciated 
in cases like Ochberg and ITC 701 that the determination of the value of 
a non-cash accrual follows an objective test, not a subjective one. This 
may be the case, but a better market equivalent would still be to look at 
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the best interest rate a person of the same credit (risk) profile as the 
company concerned would be able to fetch in the market. It is a specific 
company who is receiving the alleged right. It is a specific company that 
the Commissioner seeks to assess to income tax. It is submitted 
therefore that only in the case where no other valuation of the specific 
right is available or possible, or if the parties are unable to agree over the 
valuation, should an unrelated market equivalent be looked at to find a 
value for the right in casu. 
The more objective approach advocated by Cilliers is a so-called 
„investment opportunity‟ approach. Such approach would seek to value 
the right accrued to the company with reference to the interest rate which 
the company would have received had it invested the loan capital in an 
interest-bearing investment. Although this approach differs from the one 
applied by the Commissioner in the Brummeria decision, it is arguably 
more defensible as it is likely more objective, rendering ineffectual and 
ruling out subjective factors such as the creditworthiness of the company 
whilst still providing a fixed benchmark in the market, available to and 
thus applicable to all tax subjects. 
A third possible argument available to the company is that the right 
accrued is of a capital nature. In an exchange situation the supply in 
return for which the tax subject has received the non-cash right is of 
critical importance in determining the nature of the receipt. The company 
(B) supplied the lender (A) with a first option to buy its business. Writer 
has difficulty in seeing how this supply could fit into one of the established 
moulds of revenue activities such as capital productively employed, the 
carrying on of a business, carrying out a scheme for profit-making or a 
supply of trading stock. If of course the business of Company B was to 
trade in businesses and rights thereto, the position may be different. But 
in the specific factual and contractual circumstances Company B, it is 
submitted, would be able to present a strong argument that the receipt or 
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accrual is of a capital nature, notwithstanding the fact that it was obtained 
as a quid pro quo. 
All three of the above-mentioned arguments were not brought before the 
court (at all or timeously) in the Brummeria case and consequently the 
court did not have an opportunity to rule on them. SARS specifically 
mention these issues in their Draft Interpretation Note and furthermore 
specifically address them therein.68 SARS‟s comments in this regard 
seem to try and accommodate the taxpayer on all accounts and if either 
one of the arguments expounded above were to be adopted in factual 
circumstances similar to that in Company B‟s case, it would arguably be 
looked upon favourably by the courts. 
5.2 Absolute defence 
A situation may present itself where a shareholder makes an interest-free 
loan to its private company with the intention of capitalising, e.g. to give it 
a financial boost to fund the expansion of the latter‟s business operations. 
For the same token a father may make an interest-free loan to his son to 
enable him to buy a flat or car. Another example could be where a 
holding company makes funds available to its operating subsidiary, 
without charging interest on the monies advanced. In these cases (writer 
assumes) there is no reciprocal performance formally required of the 
borrowers. 
What arguments could such a private company, son or subsidiary offer in 
defence to an assessment by the Commissioner on the basis that there 
has accrued to it a right to retain and use borrowed funds on an annual 
without having to pay interest thereon? This accrued right, so the 
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assessment reads, constitutes an amount for „gross income‟ purposes as 
it has an ascertainable money value. 
As most of the arguments in defence have already been raised and 
expanded upon by writer to a greater or lesser extent in the discussion 
above – and have been endorsed by various sources as authority for the 
views held – the following discourse will be undertaken with as little as 
possible reference to authority. 
The first argument to be advanced by the tax subject in one of the 
circumstances alluded to above, would be that the right sought to be tax 
is not an amount otherwise than in cash for the purposes of „gross 
income‟. The basis for this argument is the basic legal nature of a loan of 
money (loan for consumption). A loan of money does not carry an 
automatic stipulation for interest. If the parties to the loan contract fail to 
contract for interest to be paid on the monies lent or it they agree that the 
loan will not be interest-bearing or if the lender unilaterally decides not to 
charge interest on the loan capital – In all such cases, interest will not be 
due. There is nothing in the common law, which determine the legal 
nature of the contract and the parties‟ reciprocal rights and duties, or in 
South African statutory law which prescribes the charging of interest on a 
monetary loan.  
Lategan‟s case found, in relation to the term amount in the gross income 
definition, that it had to be understood in a wide sense – to include both 
cash receipts, as well as “every form of property earned by the taxpayer, 
whether corporeal or incorporeal, which had a money value … including 
debts and rights of action.” Where in the case of an interest-free loan, as 
is under discussion at present, a borrower receives loan monies (a non-
receipt for „gross income‟) and such agreement is void of an agreement 
regarding interest, writer submits, borrower does not receive a „right‟ (in 
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the sense of „property‟)69 to use the loan capital without having to pay 
interest thereon. The agreement is merely silent as to a potential 
obligation that could have applied, but does not necessarily have to be 
laid upon the borrower. It has not received any right or benefit as no right 
or benefit was ever called into existence to be given or transferred to the 
borrower. If this argument was to be upheld by the court to which the tax 
subject directs its appeal, it would have successfully objected to the 
assessment raised upon it and could the enquiry be halted at this very 
early stage without the need for further examination. 
Apart from the benefit not being a right and hence not an amount, the 
above argument also has the potential to operate on another level of the 
gross income definition, namely the receipt/accrual level. If the right 
sought to be taxed is not one which legally exists, how can it be received 
by or accrue to the tax subject? Also, in dealing with receipts and 
accruals, the argument can further be made, based on the particular legal 
nature of a loan for consumption, that the right to use loan capital cannot 
accrue to a borrower on an annual basis. 
In a loan for consumption the lender transfers ownership in the monies 
lent to the borrower. The borrower, as owner of the money from that point 
onwards, has all the competencies or freedoms of any owner to do with 
its property as it pleases. Included in the transfer of ownership in the loan 
capital is the right of the owner to use the money. This competency of 
ownership is not separate, independent or divisible from ownership in this 
context and it is clearly not correct in law that the lender transfers all the 
benefits of ownership to the borrower, except the right to use the money. 
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For the above-mentioned reasons the right to use the money does not 
accrue to the borrower on an annual basis. It receives it as part of 
becoming owner of the money at the moment the loan capital is 
transferred to it. Because the lender has at such point done away with all 
its obligations in terms of the contract, there is no continual obligation on 
it to make the loan capital available to the borrower on a continuous basis 
for the duration of the loan period. 
The thrust of the above arguments can be well illustrated by way of the 
following example: 
Mr X buys a house A from Mr Y. He thus becomes the owner thereof. 
The contract between the parties stipulates that Mr X is obliged to supply 
Mr Y with a house of equal size and value (house B) in 12 months time. 
For the 12 month period following Mr X‟s acquisition he lives in house A. 
He is not expected to include in his gross income a right equal to the 
economic value or benefit of not having to pay rent on the house. Why 
not? He does not acquire the right to use the house because it is his 
house and the right to use it is his. Also he is not obliged to pay rent to Mr 
Y, because Mr Y is not obliged to charge him rent, although it may be 
possible for the parties to agree that Mr X pays Mr Y an amount of money 
monthly – to be used by Mr Y to obtain accommodation for himself over 
the 12 month period – while Mr Y waits to receive his own house to live in 
(house B) from Mr X. This illustration, though not likely to be an 
arrangement commonly entered into, writer submits, is a true reflection 
and comparable of the legal relationship between a lender and a 
borrower under a loan for consumption and also gives a perspective on it 
being interest-free. 
Should both of the first two arguments fail, the borrower will have to 
accept that there is an amount, because the decision in Brummeria was 
clear in its rejection of Stander‟s case and confirmed that the valuation of 
a right involves an objective test. There is thus no room for an argument 
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that the right has no money value as it is not possible for the borrower to 
turn it into money. 
Writer has already dispensed with three other arguments, namely that of 
the timing of the accrual, the valuation thereof and whether it is of a 
capital nature. Writer is not of the view that the binding principles 
enunciated in the Brummeria judgment would only be applicable in the 
case where there is a quid pro quo for the receipt of the interest-free loan, 
but it however seems probable that SARS would only want to invoke the 
principles established in the case in the quid pro quo milieu70 as the four 
manifestations of interest-free loan transactions indentified, could 
arguably prove to be of a capital nature. 
5.3 Conclusion 
Throughout the course of the above discussion writer has endeavoured 
to show, and submits, has been able to successfully establish that in the 
case of a borrower of interest-free loan capital, there exist strong grounds 
on which to defend an assessment for income tax on the basis of the 
Brummeria judgment. 
Both in the case of a limited scope application of the principles in 
Brummeria as well as instances of a wide-ranging application thereof, tax 
subjects should have sound, reliable cases to put forward in defence of 
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6 CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSION 
The discussion above has attempted to address the following aims: 
The first objective sought to be met by writer through the course of this 
discussion was to establish what the correct or at least the accepted 
income tax treatment of interest-free loans in the hands of a borrower, 
has been up until the decision of the SCA in Brummeria. Writer has 
shown this treatment to be dependent on and predicated upon the 
specific legal nature of a contract for the loan of money – a type of the 
legal figure „loan for consumption‟ or mutuum. 
The conclusion reached in this regard is that an interest-free loan, would 
in general not have any adverse income tax consequences for the 
borrower. Such conclusion has been confirmed by the Johannesburg tax 
court‟s decision in the appeal that preceded the SCA judgment. 
The discussion above has further attempted to draw a conclusion or 
conclusions regarding what parts of the SCA‟s decision in Brummeria 
could be said to represent the binding principles of the case. An in depth 
study was undertaken of the judgment and a conclusion was reached 
with regards to which statements of the court formed part of its ratio 
decidendi and which were mere obiter dicta. Writer also took clear 
cognisance of the opinion communicated by the Revenue authority71 
regarding their interpretation of the case and what they perceive the 
binding principles enunciated therein to be. It was concluded in this 
regard that the binding principles of the court‟s judgment were not as 
severe and as far-reaching as was originally feared by many. Rather, the 
severity of the judgment hinged upon whether the most controversial 
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statement in the judgment formed part of the binding pronouncements of 
the court. Writer‟s conclusion was that this statement did not fall within 
the court‟s ratio decidendi and does not have the strength of stare 
decisis. 
Once the binding power of the judgment had been identified, writer 
conducted a study into the likely ambit or scope of the Brummeria 
judgment‟s application to other interest-free loans – those encountered 
most often in commercial and private transactions. The opinions of 
various tax experts were consulted and it was revealed that two broad 
schools of thought had developed among the ranks of the leading tax 
experts and commentators in the country. Some saw in the Brummeria 
judgment an „in principle‟ decision, whilst others were adamant that it 
would be confined to factual circumstances equivalent to those prevailing 
in the case itself. Practitioners propagating the second view were 
convinced that the judgment would only find application in circumstances 
where the interest-free loan was received as quid pro quo, i.e. as 
consideration for or in exchange for, some supply by the borrower which 
is of a revenue nature. SARS‟s views in this regard were also alluded to.  
Writer, although not committing himself to one of the crystallised broad 
opinions did draw a conclusion with regards to the potential impact of the 
binding principles of the case on interest-free loans in the hands of a 
borrower in general. It was found that the impact of the case on these 
loans may arguably be minor, as the factual circumstances in Brummeria 
was one of the strongest factors leading to the ultimate taxability of the 
benefits flowing from the receipt of the loan without having to pay interest 
thereon. As most of the commonly encountered interest-free loans in 
practice are not couched in such a factual situation, it should prove 
unaffected by the Brummeria case. 
                                                                                                                               
71
 By way of Draft Interpretation Note released during October 2008. 
 77 
In the final instance writer sought to identify which arguments could be 
available to a particular tax subject who has been or could be assessed 
for tax by the Revenue Authorities on the basis of the Brummeria 
judgment, in order to successfully object to such assessment. 
Assessments based on two different interpretations or applications of the 
case were considered – one a limited scope application and the other a 
wide-ranging application of the judgment, whereby the Commissioner 
would seek to tax any interest-free loan. The arguments advanced drew 
on principles articulated by writer throughout the course of this paper and 
it was concluded that in both scenario‟s, but especially so in the case of a 
wide-ranging attack, the borrower involved would be able to make a 
strong case, either to have the assessments set aside altogether or to 
have them significantly reduced or adjusted because of timing and/or 
valuation issues. 
Writer believes that the above discourse has reached the aims set 
therefore and has come up with meaningful answers in relation to the 
implications of the Brummeria Renaissance case for those interest-free 
loans encountered most often in the commercial world, such as inter-
company loans and shareholder loans to a companies, as well as in the 
private sphere, i.e. loans between family members and from the founder 
to an inter vivos trust. The conclusions reached throughout the course of 
the discussion has shown that fears regarding the potentially devastating 
implications of the judgment for the borrower in an interest-free loan 
transaction are not necessarily founded on sound legal doctrine and that 
a prudent understanding and application of the law should in many cases 
safeguard a borrower assessed for income tax on strength of the 
Brummeria case from being hit by an income tax liability. 
---000--- 
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